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. Introduction
The study of digital innovations and their adoption by organi-
ations has generated a ﬁeld of research whose aim is to unravel
nalytical challenges such as the productivity paradox1 and estab-
ish an empirical knowledge base upon which scholars can build.
ur research contributes to this on-going effort by focusing on
he effect that digital network innovation adoption has over time
n bank performance. The ﬁnancial services sector was  an early
dopter of key technologies associated with business transfor-
ation and it is currently one of the most intensive users of
nformation and communication technologies (ICT). While atten-
ion has been drawn to relatively poor gains from ICT investment
n the ﬁnancial services sector, ﬁndings from relevant research are
nconclusive (Roach, 1991; Haynes and Thompson, 2000; Beccalli,
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: markos.zachariadis@wbs.ac.uk (M.  Zachariadis).
1 This trend was appropriately characterized by Robert Solow’s famous quote that
you  can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics’ (Solow,
987), which eventually became known as the “Productivity Paradox” (Roach, 1991;
rynjolfsson, 1993).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2017.03.010
048-7333/© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article u2007; Kretschmer, 2012). Can strategic investments in certain
information systems provide better explanations than broad analy-
ses of a ﬁrm’s aggregate IT investment (Aral and Weill, 2007)? The
need for research here is acute because, practitioners and policy
makers have scarce resources with which to base actions, and schol-
ars lack the datasets and foundational knowledge claims about
innovation adoption in ﬁnancial services with which they can draw
up agendas for future research.
In an effort to address these challenges, we  begin by examin-
ing the approaches used to-date in studies of digital innovation
adoption in the ﬁnancial services. We  then add to this emerg-
ing knowledge base by presenting an analysis of adoption data
from SWIFT, the ﬁnancial digital network innovation and standards
developed in the 1970s to serve as the infrastructure for worldwide
interbank payments communication. We  construct and analyse a
new dataset comprising SWIFT’s adoption history from 1977 to
2005 matched to bank-level performance data for the US, Canada
and 27 European countries. Our analysis breaks from the majority
of past research by utilizing a distinctive longitudinal approach to
investigate claims in the literature. While there is now evidence of
productivity beneﬁts from ICT adoption, most prior research has
not considered whether these beneﬁts are sustained in the long
nder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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erm. Our research focuses on the following questions. Firstly, is
here evidence that ICT adoption generates long-term beneﬁts for
rms? Secondly, do these beneﬁts accumulate over time? Thirdly,
o particular kinds of ﬁrms beneﬁt more than others in the long
erm? Fourthly, what are the mechanisms underlying these bene-
ts?
Our ﬁndings determine the timeframe in which beneﬁts from
igital innovation adoption accrue and establish their correspon-
ence with network effects. In so doing, we reveal surprising results
oncerning the performance of small banks relative to large banks.
mall and medium enterprises (SMEs) are frequently referred to
s the ‘backbone’ of the economy because they play an impor-
ant role in job creation (Brynjolfsson et al., 1994), technology
nvestment, and GDP growth (Kuan and Chau, 2001) yet research
bout the effects of ICT adoption on their economic performance is
parse. There is a tendency in the adoption literature to treat small
rms as “scaled-down” replicas of larger businesses (Raymond,
985; Thong et al., 1996) and generalize about them based on
arge ﬁrm only datasets. We  ﬁnd small ﬁrms beneﬁt disproportion-
tely from SWIFT which is remarkable as this means overcoming
carce resources including relatively limited knowledge of technol-
gy management (Pfeiffer, 1992; Grandon and Pearson, 2004).
Throughout the paper, we complement the quantitative analy-
is with an in-depth ﬁeld study to explore the dynamic interplay
etween the process of adopting SWIFT and the mechanisms used
o realise beneﬁts from that adoption. We  argue that this not only
as implications for how ﬁrms can leverage ICT-investments but
lso suggests insights into adoption strategies for ﬁrms navigating
he current business landscape in which potentially value-adding
igital infrastructures are an integral part. In the next section, we
ill review the literature upon which we build our study.
. ICT adoption and ﬁrm performance
In the past, ambiguity concerning the economic impact of infor-
ation and communication technology adoption or what has been
ermed the “productivity paradox” was hotly debated. Initial results
uring the 1980s and 1990s created concerns about whether ICT
ad any signiﬁcant effect on economic output, but over the last
ouple of decades evidence has mounted conﬁrming that ICT does
ield sizable economic returns at both macro and micro levels
Brynjolfsson, 1993; Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 1998; Bloom et al.,
012). More speciﬁcally, a large number of recent studies report
ositive results from ICT investments on a range of measures relat-
ng to ﬁnancial performance (Aral et al., 2006; Bresnahan et al.,
002; Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 1996, 2000, 2003; Dewan and Kraemer,
000).2
These ﬁndings are consistent with the Schumpeterian economic
heoretical tradition that recognizes the importance of technolog-
cal change and innovation as being the key drivers of economic
rowth and ﬁrm performance (see Romer, 1990; David, 1990;
ghion and Howitt, 2007). In this line of work, technological
nnovation plays a key role in explaining the dynamic properties
f organizations (Cainelli et al., 2006). According to Schumpeter
1943), innovation puts in motion the mechanism of “creative
estruction” in which technological advances override pre-existing
arket conditions. In the process, ﬁrms introduce new products,
ervices and organizational processes thus gaining market share at
he expense of their non-innovating competitors. Some are then
ble to leverage their new competitive position and gradually
ccumulate “monopolistic rents”, increasing their proﬁtability still
urther (Cainelli et al., 2006).
2 For a more detailed review of the literature see surveys by Brynjolfsson and Yang
1996), and Draca et al. (2007).cy 46 (2017) 984–1004 985
Whilst the Schumpeterian approach is useful in describing the
link between technological innovation and organizational per-
formance, empirical evidence on the magnitude and nature of
the contribution of technology seem to vary considerably across
economies, sectors, and ﬁrms prompting much discussion about
different measures of economic performance and innovation. For
example, at the macro-level, most studies focus on measures of
economy-wide productivity and labour productivity growth to
make claims regarding the aggregate contribution of technology
investment (Brynjolfsson and Yang, 1996). A case in point would
be Gust and Marquez (2004) who  analyse data from 13 OECD coun-
tries between 1993 and 2000 and ﬁnd that ICT expenditure in
this period is associated with higher productivity growth. Simi-
larly, Oliner and Sichel (2000) demonstrate that ICT capital makes
a signiﬁcant contribution to the output growth rate of the US econ-
omy (between 0.6% and 1.1%) at various intervals during the period
1972–1999. Using data from the UK, Oulton (2002) found evidence
of increased ICT contribution to GDP growth (up to 20.7%) for the
years 1979–1998. Gordon (2016) provides a more sceptical per-
spective on the contribution of ICT to US growth, arguing that
the main effects were all focused in the short window 1996–2004
period.
Using economy-wide data is problematic as it is difﬁcult to con-
trol for many other factors. More recent industry-level studies also
found notable returns to ICT investments. Based on an analysis of
61 industries in the U.S., Stiroh (2002) uncovered evidence sug-
gesting faster productivity growth – both total factor productivity
(TFP) and average labour productivity (ALP) – in sectors that pro-
duced or used ICT more intensely. While several other studies have
reported similar conclusions (e.g. Siegel and Griliches, 1992; Berndt
and Morrison, 1995; etc.), it is apparent that the degree of the effect
varies considerably between countries and industries. Stiroh (2002)
found the strongest impact in IT-intensive services whereas oth-
ers have found manufacturing to be more important (Baily, 1986;
Roach, 1991). There has also been much recent work at the ﬁrm
level. Here, most studies reveal a positive and signiﬁcant correlation
between the adoption of ICT and business performance. In a series
of analyses using a large sample of company surveys, Brynjolfsson
and Hitt (1993, 1995, 1996), report that ICT capital generates up
to 10 times more output than other forms of capital. Although,
other papers have produced similar results that point to a positive
effect from ICT adoption (Jorgenson and Stiroh, 1995; Oliner and
Sichel, 1994; etc.), there is less agreement on the magnitude of the
gains. In a meta-analysis of 20 econometric studies, Stiroh (2002),
reports considerable variation with estimates of ICT-elasticity rang-
ing from −0.06 to 0.24. Even though these are largely attributed
to differences in production function speciﬁcations, the estima-
tion techniques, and quality of data used, there are other important
dimensions such as the timing and span of the sample period, the
ICT-measures used (Evangelista, 2000), and the characteristics of
the adopters included in the sample. Such variations in ﬁndings
may  also be because different types of technologies are lumped
together as “ICT capital” or “computers.” (Weill, 1992; Barua et al.,
1991).
To move forward the research agenda on technology adoption,
more detailed empirical data is needed, and Anderson et al. (2006)
and Jun (2008) emphasise that this need is particularly urgent in
the ﬁnancial services sector especially with the current wave of
“ﬁntech” innovation where different technologies can have vari-
ous effects on organisations (Evangelista, 2000). To address this, we
gather detailed ﬁrm-level data that incorporates larger samples of
companies across longer periods to account for both sample selec-
tion bias and adjustments that take place over time. The availability
of a long observation window offers us the unique opportunity to
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ain valuable information regarding the long-term impact of tech-
ological innovation on bank performance.
.1. Long-term outcomes from technological innovation adoption
A key debate on the value of ICT has been the effect of technol-
gy on long-term proﬁtability and its capacity to create sustainable
ompetitive advantage (Clemons and Row, 1991; Clemons, 1986).
 long standing theoretical claim in this literature asserts that
ew technology adoption will offer beneﬁts in terms of enhanced
ost efﬁciencies, better product quality, and increased value to
ustomers but the economic rents and value realised from these
eneﬁts will not last long due to the high imitability of ICT. Thus,
he ICT applications adopted by ﬁrms have the status of “strate-
ic necessities” and advantages from their early adoption and use
re lost through imitation and do not lead to proﬁtability increases
Clemons and Kimbrough, 1986; Fuentelsaz et al., 2012; Carr, 2003).
his hypothesis largely relies on the assumption that ICT is highly
ommoditized and therefore easily replicable at a low cost (Carr,
003). In other words, it is expected that technology will be dif-
used and adopted homogenously – without ‘frictions’ or delays
cross competitor ﬁrms, a claim that is disputed in the technological
iffusion literature where there are many factors that can prevent
ome ﬁrms from speedily adopting a technology (Fuentelsaz et al.,
012). The counter claim holds that there are alternative ways with
hich organizations incorporate ICT into their productive process,
se complementary assets, or reconsider their business strategy in
ight of technological change, which can lead to persistent differ-
nces in performance that cannot be accounted for by the strategic
ecessity hypothesis (Battisti et al., 2009).
To address these fundamental arguments around long-term
erformance and sustainability we need a longitudinal approach
hich enables us to go beyond the short-term effects of technol-
gy adoption to reveal the varying temporal proﬁle and impact of
nnovation. A few papers have attempted to focus on the long-term
ffects of ICT using micro data. (e.g. Kwon and Stoneman, 1995, for
ve manufacturing technologies or Haynes and Thompson (2000)
n Automated Teller Machine (ATM) networks).
We  build our study upon two key insights from this prior lit-
rature both of which centre on the importance of constructing
ong lags. Firstly, intra-ﬁrm diffusion and technological adapta-
ion often takes time (Tyre and Orlikowski, 1994; Fuentelsaz et al.,
009). Second, there is often the need for signiﬁcant organizational
hanges and learning (Van de Ven, 1986; Brynjolfsson and Yang,
996; David, 1990). Studies using short lags are unable to capture
otential beneﬁts that may  accumulate over time from the tech-
ology investment. As Fuentelsaz et al. (2012) argue, the uneven
atterns of technological diffusion mean that it is possible for bene-
ts accrued by adopters (in comparison to non-adopters) to endure
or several years depending on the timing of the diffusion process.
hirdly, beyond ﬁrm heterogeneity, particular focus must be given
o the speciﬁc characteristics of network innovations and their
trategic importance for long-term economic performance.
Network externalities can arise when usage beneﬁts increase
ith network size (Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Shapiro and Varian,
999; Farrell and Saloner, 1992). For example, Saloner and
hepard’s (1995) show that as more ATMs are installed, the network
ize grows, making it hold higher value for cardholders and banks
ecause the connectivity produced provides more utility. Although
here are comparable results in other industries (Economides,
996), empirical work on ﬁnancial services network effects is in
hort supply and very focused on ATMs. This is cause for concern
n a sector whose history has been deﬁned by network innovations
nd network platforms are undergoing critical development.cy 46 (2017) 984–1004
2.2. Firm size and technology effectiveness
There has been relatively little econometric research on the
effects of ICT on smaller ﬁrms. For example, Brynjolfsson and Hitt
(1996) used data from some of the largest US corporations (367
ﬁrms generating approximately $1.8 trillion of gross output annu-
ally). Small organizations possess some unique characteristics that
matter signiﬁcantly when new technology is introduced (Raymond,
1985; Thong et al., 1996; Kuan and Chau, 2001). For example, the
relative costs and risks from ICT adoption and implementation
can be considerably higher for smaller ﬁrms due to their limited
resources and lack of knowledge around technology management
(Pfeiffer, 1992; Grandon and Pearson, 2004).
In contrast to positive outcomes relating to the introduction and
use of ICT in large organizations, research ﬁndings regarding the
effect of technology in SMEs have been ambiguous at best. Empiri-
cal evidence from the literature on small business ICT suggests that
a number of factors inhibit the uptake of technological innovation
and impede the beneﬁts of ICT adoption. These include a vital lack
of ﬁnancial resources with which to acquire ICT capital, invest in
technological skills and achieve systems integration (Pfeiffer, 1992;
Grandon and Pearson, 2004; Saunders and Clark, 1992). Similar
results are also reported by Cragg and King (1993), who identify
economic costs and shortage of technical knowledge as key barriers
to ICT gains in the context of small organizations. Finally, Ballantine
et al. (1998) identiﬁed distinctive features of SMEs such as narrow
access to capital supplies, absence of business and IT strategy, and
greater emphasis on using technology to automate (Zuboff, 1988).
A more optimistic outlook is given by Dos Santos and Peffers (1995)
who found inconclusive results regarding ﬁrm size and the impact
of ICT on market share and income gains. Looking at a sample of
banks and the beneﬁts from ATM adoption they conclude that there
are no economies of scale or scope for this technology that favour
larger institutions in particular, however, they did not ﬁnd any sig-
niﬁcant results to suggest that such a technology can speciﬁcally
beneﬁt smaller ﬁrms either. A similar view is shared by Lacity et al.
(2014) who suggest that certain technologies, for example cloud
computing can provide equal beneﬁts to both large and smaller
ﬁrms albeit in different ways.
Of particular interest for our study are hypotheses that con-
tradict the generally accepted view and suggest that small
organizations may  hold certain advantages over their larger com-
petitors. For instance, perhaps smaller enterprises can adapt faster
to internal and external changes in their operating environment,
whereas larger organizations may  respond slowly to technologi-
cal transformation due to legacy systems that demand substantial
modiﬁcations (Dos Santon and Peffers, 1995). Evidence of this
would be remarkable because it would mean that small busi-
nesses achieve beneﬁts from ICT adoption that in the long run
outweigh more obvious big ﬁrm advantages such as ample ﬁnancial
resources, ICT expertise, and economies of scale.
The literature on the effects of ICT has shown that ﬁrms bene-
ﬁt mostly from cost reductions due to automation and increase of
efﬁciencies in the production process and less from an increase in
revenue streams. Bigger ﬁrms are commonly expected to be more
efﬁcient and thus anticipate better results in this regard (Hall and
Weiss, 1967), but as we  will go on to argue there is also evidence
that despite their size smaller businesses may also achieve sig-
niﬁcant leverage from ICT adoption. Indeed, some of the existing
literature points to the realisation of a range of beneﬁts includ-
ing operational savings, improvements in business processes, the
cultivation of new markets, higher sales turnover and increases in
proﬁtability (Currie and Parikh, 2006; Kuan and Chau, 2001).
In sum, thus far research examining the impact of ICT adoption
on smaller ﬁrms, including mechanisms of value creation and the
beneﬁts generated has remained largely inconclusive. This leaves
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institutions – to “exchange structured business information elec-
tronically” (Iacovou et al., 1995; p.466). SWIFT’s diffusion began
with European-based banks and gradually moved to countries such
as the US and UK (see Fig. 1).6 In this section, we provide a detailed
4 An exception to this is Beccalli (2007), who looks at a total of 737 banks in 5
European countries, however, the panel data used cover only 5 years in total andS.V. Scott et al. / Researc
onsiderable scope for the study that we have undertaken here in
hich we ask not only if there is evidence that ICT adoption gen-
rates long-term beneﬁts for ﬁrms but whether particular kinds of
rms – small ﬁrms – beneﬁt more than others in the long term.
.3. Financial technology and bank performance
Traditionally, ﬁnance has been the highest spender across all
ectors. For example, data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Anal-
sis measure computer (OCAM) expenditure in ﬁnancial services
etween 32.5%-38.7%, from 1979 to 1992 (cf. Brynjolfsson and
ang, 1996; Griliches, 1995). Recent aggregate ﬁgures on technol-
gy investment worldwide place the banking and securities sector
t the top of ICT spenders’ list with a total expenditure of $486.28
illion– approximately 18% of the total technology investment or
4.8% if we include the insurance industry.3 Consequently, the
mplications of ICT adoption and use for the global ﬁnancial system
ave been fundamental. ICT did not only transform transaction pro-
esses but is also associated with shifting organizational boundaries
Scott and Walsham, 1998), facilitating the creation of new ﬁnan-
ial products, changing the nature of work (Barrett and Walsham
999), globalizing ﬁnancial markets (Sassen, 2002; Weber, 1994)
nd restructuring the character of ﬁnancial intermediation (BIS,
002).
Some qualitative case studies have been used to study the
ffects of ICT on ﬁnancial performance (e.g. Scott and Barrett, 2005;
lemons and Weber, 1990). For example, Autor et al. (2002) exam-
ne the introduction of automatic image processing on one of the
op 20 US banks, arguing that the introduction of complementary
rganizational changes were crucial in understanding the impact
n performance. In Weill and Olson (1989), the authors use six case
tudies to investigate the impact that the level of ICT investment
as on ﬁrm performance. Their results, from a series of interviews
ith banking professionals, demonstrate the organizational com-
lexities involved in deﬁning ICT and difﬁculties encountered when
earching for an appropriate measure to estimate the impact of
echnology. Such ﬁndings are particularly useful in order to under-
tand the richness of processes and technology strategies in speciﬁc
ontexts, but are hard to generalise due to their speciﬁc nature.
In terms of econometric studies on ICT in ﬁnancial services,
asolaro and Gobbi (2007) estimate proﬁt and cost functions for
 panel of 600 Italian banks 1989–2000 and ﬁnd that ICT capital
ntensive techniques signiﬁcantly increase total factor productivity
TFP). Jun (2008), examines ﬁndings from several studies showing
 positive relationship between ICT and banking performance, and
lso presents results indicating that ICT investments are associated
ith higher returns on assets in a sample of 22 South Korean secu-
ities ﬁrms. Similarly, Anderson et al. (2006) investigate the value
mplications of ICT investments on a panel of 62 Fortune 100 banks
nd ﬁnd that ﬁrm value increased on average with Y2 K spending
n technology. Also, Parsons et al. (1993) estimate a cost function
sing data from a single large Canadian bank between 1974 and
987 ﬁnding a weak but signiﬁcant correlation between productiv-
ty growth and the use of computers. Finally, Alpar and Kim (1990)
xplore the impact of ICT on the production of bank services ﬁnding
hat technology is cost saving, labour saving and capital using.
Although these studies are useful in order to understand the
eneral effect of ICT, treating technology as a single aggregated
ategory makes it hard to disentangle which aspects of ICT led to
erformance increases and identify the dynamic effects of tech-
ology adoption. As a result, many authors have pointed out the
3 Source: Gardner (September 2015). Manufacturing and natural resources fol-
owed with 476.55 billion USD. These ﬁgures are based on real data and partial
rojections for 2015, however, ICT expenditure in 2014 follows a similar pattern.cy 46 (2017) 984–1004 987
scarcity of longitudinal studies examining particular ICT innova-
tions in ﬁnancial services. In a survey, Frame and White (2004)
could only identify eight studies of which six use the same data
on ATM diffusion (Hannan and McDowell, 1984, 1987; Sinha
and Chandrashekaran, 1992; Saloner and Shepherd, 1995; etc.).
Although they represent an important body of research, these
studies focus more on the diffusion of speciﬁc innovations and
less on their impact upon business performance. Thus, Frame and
White (2004) conclude that we  have a lot of “talk” about ﬁnancial
innovation but “little action”. In other words, given the size and
importance of the ﬁnancial sector, the number of relevant studies
is surprisingly limited and further scholarly efforts are needed.
In this paper, we  combine insights from several different
research approaches. As a result, the approach taken here presents
some distinct advantages, for example: ﬁrstly it proposes the in-
depth investigation of a particular ICT-related innovation (SWIFT)
in the banking sector rather than examining ‘general purpose tech-
nologies’ or ICT broadly, followed by an econometric analysis on
the impact of SWIFT of bank performance. Secondly, the span of
the data allows us to track the effects of SWIFT adoption in a
large sample of banks (6848 in total) across 29 countries. Previ-
ous micro-econometric studies have limited themselves to a single
country4 even though many industries, such as ﬁnancial services,
are international in scope. Thirdly, based on the whole popula-
tion of SWIFT adopters we  are able to track the long-run effects
of adoption (up to 30 years) which is important as the impact of
innovation is unlikely to be realised in the short run (Geroski et al.,
1993). Finally, in order to explore the impact of SWIFT adoption on
bank performance and the value–creating mechanisms that come
into play once the technology is implemented – for both small
and large banks − we draw on insights from previous qualitative
research (Scott and Zachariadis, 2012, 2014). The complementary
data was  gathered through archival research as well as interviews
with SWIFT employees, bank executives, and domain experts who
described the SWIFT implementation process, its cost and potential
beneﬁts for different kinds of ﬁnancial services organizations.
3. Overview of SWIFT and research setting
Our empirical analysis focuses on the adoption of an ‘inter-bank’
ﬁnancial telecommunication network called SWIFT. Launched in
1973, SWIFT’s mission was to facilitate correspondence banking
by automating communication between banks through the intro-
duction of machine readable encrypted messaging standards, thus,
enabling banks to send funds directly to counterparts at increased
speed, in higher volumes, for reduced cost, and with improved secu-
rity (Winder, 1985). In some regards, SWIFT can be compared to
an electronic data interchange (EDI) or co-operative interorganiza-
tional system (IOS) allowing trading partners – in this case ﬁnancial
5fail to identify any long-term effects which may last up to 10 years.
5 In the case of SWIFT these are ﬁnancial messages such as instructions for pay-
ments, conﬁrmations, settlement messages, letters of credit, securities transactions,
and other types of standardized processes.
6 Fig. 1 presents the accumulative diffusion curve of all SWIFT adopters across
eight of the countries in our sample between 1977 and 2006. Even though Germany
led the way  until approx. 1985, the US and UK SWIFT population base grew sub-
stantially making these two countries the largest SWIFT adopters. As it can be seen
the  diffusion curve does not seem to follow the traditional “S” shape, which could
suggest that the SWIFT diffusion process has not been completed by any means.
988 S.V. Scott et al. / Research Policy 46 (2017) 984–1004
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verview of SWIFT’s proprietary communications platform: its net-
ork, the costs and beneﬁts from its adoption, and its mission. We
onclude by considering the assumptions made by practitioners in
nancial services about the beneﬁts of SWIFT membership.
SWIFT has established itself as a trusted third party, functioning
s the core gateway especially for large-value payments. Weirdt
t al. (2005) described it “as an obligatory passage point to other
arts of the transactional infrastructure, which gives it effective
ontrol of the [global] payment system”. Since its founding, there
as been a working concord among SWIFT members to support its
peration as a not-for-proﬁt “industry co-operative”, reinvesting
ny surplus in process and product improvement. During its life-
ime, there have been some business and connectivity ‘solutions’
n the tech market that engaged in competition, however they only
ccounted for a small fraction of business, and did not offer a com-
arable level of service or global coverage, nor they performed its
tandards and community development roles.
As the ﬁrst network innovation of its kind in ﬁnancial services,
WIFT necessitated the development of messaging standards to
educe operational complexity and advancements in network secu-
ity protocols. Today SWIFT operates a highly reliable and secure IP
etwork (SIPN) that offers a single window access to the ﬁnancial
orld and allows for interoperability and high end-to-end automa-
ion (also known as “Straight-Through-Processing”) through a vast
ange of standards, technological applications and connectivity
olutions.
.1. Costs and beneﬁts of SWIFT adoption
The costs and beneﬁts of adoption for different banks can
ary signiﬁcantly which means a thorough analysis of deploy-
ent (usage needs, interfaces, standards compliance, etc.) must be
ndertaken in the pre-implementation phase (see Fig. 2). The main
xed costs relate to the original installation which includes all the
tems in the implementation phase. Once SWIFT is up and running
post-implementation stage) there are additional costs associated
ith maintenance, fees, training, software and hardware upgrades,
nd improvement expenses. Going forward there may  be further
djustment costs and subsequent software development to inte-
rate the system with the internal banking processes.
In contrast to the expenses, beneﬁts are typically not realized
ntil the infrastructure is properly conﬁgured and used. The ben-
ﬁts that SWIFT can be distinguished into intangible and tangiblesen countries (1977–2006).
aspects. Potential intangible beneﬁts are related to the reduction of
operational risk and fraud (due to the less manual intervention and
more secure transaction environment), enhancement of customer
satisfaction, security and resilience, easier regulatory compliance,
greater visibility and control (allowing for better cash manage-
ment), reliability and timing. These beneﬁts are difﬁcult to measure
and therefore are not directly dealt with in our study, however, we
would expect that they can contribute towards proﬁtability.
Probably the most obvious tangible beneﬁt, especially in the
case of larger ﬁnancial institutions, is the reduction of operat-
ing expenses. While the implementation of SWIFT can be a costly
investment it is regarded as having a cost-saving effect. At a basic
level, SWIFT replaces direct links to corresponded banks with a
centralised cloud-based solution that allows member to contact
anyone on the network (see Fig. 3). However, it also helps to reduce
user’s costs by providing automation (through greater standard-
ization and interfacing), security, speed, and economies of scale
thus reducing marginal costs in the long-term via increases in
labour productivity. These beneﬁts extend across numerous busi-
ness processes and transactions commonly used in banking such
as payments, conﬁrmations, ﬁnancial reporting, pre-trade, trade,
and post-trade activities. Interviews with ﬁnancial services pro-
fessionals enabled us to document this step-by-step progressive
roll-out of SWIFT adoption through each business area. They con-
ﬁrmed that after the initial investment period, long-term operating
costs decreased as SWIFT became further integrated into their back-
ofﬁce automated production systems.
The mutuality generated by SWIFT’s industrial cooperative gov-
ernance structure ensured a phase of initial reciprocal adoption by
its founding members with subsequent momentum achieved by
leveraging the counterpart banking relationship. In other words,
ﬁrms compelled trading partners to connect as a condition of busi-
ness. Large banks were able to assert new terms of business and
thus realise the economies of scale promised by SWIFT adoption.
Other smaller ﬁrms were actively recruited as SWIFT executives
realized from the outset that network coverage was vital. Indeed,
we documented on-going programmes to connect countries and
enroll the widest possible range of ﬁnancial institutions in our ﬁeld
study.
SWIFT delivers very high reliability and is now a core part
of the largely taken-for-granted international ﬁnancial services
information systems infrastructure. Indeed, during our ﬁeld study
we frequently heard SWIFT referred to as the “plumbing” of
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Fig. 2. SWIFT implementation timeline.
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ote:  Fig. 3 presents a detailed illustration of the mechanism through which SWIFT a
nd  other proprietary networks).
nternational ﬁnancial services. In other words, ﬁnancial services
rofessionals had come to regard SWIFT as a utility that fulﬁlled a
asic but low-value facility. Moreover, its continued drive to reward
igh volumes led one interviewee to claim that SWIFT was  built “by
ig banks, for big banks”. This value neutral “utility” status and the
laim that its beneﬁts accrue mainly to large ﬁnancial ﬁrms, rep-
esents the dominant ‘industry wisdom.’ Neither claim has been
ystematically investigated, however.
Challenging these active working assumptions lies beyond the
andate of the actors involved. SWIFT’s attention is on “lean man-
gement” and their main interest is in the analysis of members’
sage patterns along functional lines (rather than size of ﬁrm). By
eﬁnition, SWIFT membership relieves ﬁrms of the need to anal-
se core transactional network technology so that they can focus
n developing other kinds of service innovation. Regulators have
versight but their attention is on audit, systemic risk and com-
liance. The impact of SWIFT adoption on ﬁrm performance thus
emains a blind spot both in the ﬁnancial services industry and the
cademic literature.alue in comparison to the old system of communication between banks (telex, FAX,
4. Data and methods
Our main dataset is the entire population of SWIFT adopters
worldwide from 1977 to 2006. This consists of the complete list of
live SWIFT users operating on their “SwiftNet FIN” (or “SNFIN”) net-
work – the most popular service and core SWIFT product – across
219 countries and territories. Considering the complexity of the
ﬁnancial systems around the world and the constraints that are
placed from national ﬁnancial regulatory bodies, we also limited
our initial analysis to Europe and the Americas. Since 1977, SNFIN
has been adopted by 3380 banks in the 29 countries of our sample.
To this panel, we matched information from Bankscope, a global
database containing information on more than 28,000 public and
private banks (adopters and non-adopters of SWIFT) around the
world. This is compiled by Bureau van Dijk (BVD), a European elec-
tronic publisher of business information. The database combines
data from seven sources including Fitch Ratings, Capital Intelli-
gence, the Economist Intelligence Unit, Moody’s, Standard and
Poor’s etc. It includes all the information in the banks’ published
accounts and is reasonably comprehensive in coverage. The prod-
uct of this merge is a unique dataset containing a large sample
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Table 1
Country Statistics.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Country name Sample ﬁrms Percent Number of SWIFT
adopters
Percentage of SWIFT
population
Matched adopters in
sample
Proportion (%) of
adopters in sample
Austria 230 3.36 100 1.22 69 30.00
Belgium 98 1.43 88 1.08 43 43.39
Canada 83 1.21 62 0.76 31 37.35
Cyprus 29 0.42 38 0.46 15 51.72
Czech Republic 32 0.47 28 0.34 16 50.00
Denmark 121 1.77 59 0.72 41 33.88
Estonia 10 0.15 13 0.16 7 70.00
Finland 19 0.28 22 0.27 7 36.84
France 468 6.83 250 3.06 118 25.21
Germany 1710 24.97 298 3.65 178 10.40
Greece 23 0.34 41 0.50 19 82.60
Hungary 40 0.58 43 0.53 25 62.50
Ireland 70 1.02 81 0.99 37 52.85
Italy  782 11.42 258 3.16 167 21.35
Latvia 23 0.34 27 0.33 23 100.00
Lithuania 10 0.15 12 0.15 10 100.00
Luxembourg 115 1.68 148 1.81 83 72.17
Malta 14 0.20 15 0.18 9 64.28
Netherlands 101 1.47 98 1.20 45 44.55
Norway 88 1.29 34 0.42 17 19.31
Poland 52 0.76 47 0.57 39 75.00
Portugal 47 0.69 45 0.55 31 65.95
Slovakia 21 0.31 20 0.24 14 66.67
Slovenia 20 0.29 23 0.28 17 85.00
Spain  166 2.42 120 1.47 71 42.77
Sweden 139 2.03 35 0.43 14 9.35
Switzerland 539 7.87 270 3.30 162 30.00
United Kingdom 455 6.64 538 6.58 177 38.90
USA  1343 19.61 567 6.94 204 15.19
Total  6848 100.00 3380 41.34 1689 24.66
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ata  on the population of SWIFT adopters in the 29 countries of our sample. Colu
olumn 6 reports what is the proportion (%) of the matched adopters in the whole s
f ﬁrm-level longitudinal information on ICT adoption and ﬁnan-
ial performance. Our ﬁnancial data run from 1997 (the ﬁrst year
hat Bankscope was produced) through 2006, but due to the small
umber of observations in years 1997 and 2006, we exclude them
rom our estimations and exploit the years from 1998 to 2005. After
leaning7 we are left with an unbalanced panel of 6848 ﬁrms and
p to eight years of ﬁnancial data.
In order for ﬁrms not to switch deﬁnition (between small and
ig) in our sample we ﬁrst construct an average of the total assets
or every ﬁrm. We  then use this median for our split.
In Table 1, we present our sample size by country including
 separate column for SWIFT adopters. While SWIFT is adopted
y many organizations including broker/dealers, corporates, cus-
odians, investment managers, payment and securities market
nfrastructures (i.e. stock exchanges) and other non-ﬁnancial insti-
utions, we only keep the matched data from the SWIFT-Bankscope
erge including the non-adopter ﬁrms from Bankscope. Thus, the
esulting dataset exclusively contains banking institutions of all
inds existing in Bankscope. Looking down column (1), we see that
lmost a quarter of ﬁrms are in Germany (mostly due to the popu-
arity of local savings banks known as Sparkassen)  and almost one
fth in the US. Other countries which have many banks in the sam-
le are the UK (6.6%), France (6.8%), Switzerland (7.9%) and Italy
11.4%).8 In order to avoid any duplication in our data we  excluded
7 We clean our dataset from extreme negative and positive values that appear in
ur factor inputs. We  also avoid dropping the data by winsorising our performance
ariables on the top and bottom percentiles. Results are similar if we simply trim
he outliers.
8 The 29 countries and 3380 SWIFT adopters in our database cover 41.34% of
he  entire SWIFT population globally which is about 8176 ﬁrms in 219 countries
nd  territories. From the 3380 SWIFT adopters we  managed to match 1689 onto-adopters). Adoption information is from 1977 to 2006. The third column contains
reports the number of adopters by country that were matched in the sample and
e.
the unconsolidated accounts if we had their consolidated compan-
ions and used unconsolidated accounts of a subsidiary when there
were no consolidated companions (results were robust when using
only consolidated or only unconsolidated accounts).
Measuring productivity is extremely challenging in the ﬁnan-
cial sector, mainly due to the difﬁculties involved in developing an
adequate price index for value added. In this paper, we focus on
the proﬁt margin deﬁned as gross pre-tax operating proﬁts divided
by revenue (“return on sales”) as our key performance measure
(we also compare the results to alternative normalizations such as
assets or equity). Accounting proﬁts can diverge from economic
proﬁts, but the two are likely to be correlated at the ﬁrm level and
there is a tradition in industrial economics which supports using
proﬁtability as a key measure of ﬁrm performance (Slade, 2004).
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics. The median bank in the
sample is not large: it has 164 employees, sales of $49 million and
$5.9 m in proﬁt. The proﬁt margin is 0.13. Note, however, that the
data is quite skewed as mean sales are $638 m with a standard
deviation of $3,702 m.  The other parts of the table break down
the descriptive statistics by ﬁrm size and country. Proﬁts are the
difference of revenues and costs, so we also present results that dis-
aggregate proﬁtability into the revenue and cost components. We
also examine the change in employment following SWIFT adoption
as a further outcome.
Our main indicator of diffusion is simply an adoption dummy
equal to unity in the year that the bank adopts SwiftNet Fin marked
by the end of the post-implementation and the start of the “Live”
phase (recall Fig. 2). It is unclear when the pre-implementation
the Bankscope database. As mentioned above, SWIFT is adopted by a number of
non-banking organizations that are not included in Bankscope (about half).
S.V. Scott et al. / Research Poli
Table  2
Descriptive statistics.
Obs. Median Mean Stdev
Variables
Total assets (m$) 29970 729.43 10300 62000
Total sales (m$) 29970 49.705 637.6793 3701.933
Pre-tax proﬁts (m$) 29970 5.936 104.894 759.944
Employees 29970 164 1460.54 8479.635
Operating expenses (m$) 29901 20.1 259.637 1674.894
Ratios
Proﬁt margin 29970 0.1384 0.1522 0.1524
Return on assets 29970 0.61 0.7822 0.9919
Return on equity 29946 7.43 8.5566 8.1563
Cost to income 29789 67.13 68.337 29.8822
Small Firms
Total assets (m$) 14300 255.992 294.235 211.316
Total sales (m$) 14300 17.273 22.053 27.465
Pre-tax proﬁts (m$) 14300 1.808 3.396 9.0938
Proﬁt margin 14300 0.1308 0.1418 0.156
Big Firms
Total assets (m$) 15670 2429.1 19400 84700
Total sales (m$) 15670 162.521 1199.482 5054.607
Pre-tax proﬁts (m$) 15670 22.23 197.518 1042.361
Proﬁt margin 15670 0.1459 0.1618 0.1483
Notes: Sample includes 6848 ﬁrms in 29 countries, from 1998 to 2005; m$ = Millions
of  US Dollars. Small and Big ﬁrms are split according to the overall median of the
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e  then use this median for our split.
hase begins so we are careful to test for the exact timing (see
elow). In particular, it is likely that the beneﬁts of SWIFT will not
e observed in the ﬁrst year, but instead there will be a longer-
erm dynamic at work between the introduction of SWIFT and its
ventual effect on the bottom line. The fact that we  have the entire
istory of all adoptions of SWIFT is helpful here because we are
ble to construct long lags back to 1978 for each ﬁrm. In other
ords, we are able (in 1998) to include up to a twenty-year dis-
ributed lag for SWIFT adoption to examine the dynamic effects on
rm performance.
We  do not have data on the intensity of usage of SWIFT for the
hole period − some proxies exist in one or two years but these
re not consistent across countries. Consequently, we focus on the
imple adoption dummy  as is standard in the diffusion literature.
. Modelling strategy
The main equation of interest is:
II/S)it = Lj=0 ˛jSWIFTi,t−j + ˇ1Xit + i + Tt + εit (1)
here (˘/S)it is the proﬁt margin, the ratio of pre-tax proﬁts to
ales of ﬁrm i at time t. Xit denotes a vector of control variables
uch as the log of total assets to employees as proxy for the fact
hat ﬁrms of different capital intensity have different proﬁt sales
argins (e.g. if there are high ﬁxed costs gross margins will be
igher). We include a full set of ﬁrm ﬁxed-effects, i to control
or permanent unobserved heterogeneity (the country dummies
re absorbed into this) and time dummies to control for macro-
conomic shocks, Tt . Finally, εit is an idiosyncratic error term whose
roperties we discuss below. SWIFTit is an adoption variable that
s a binary dummy  variable taking the value of one in the year of
he “go-live” phase of adoption and all years after (and zero in the
ears before the go-live year). We  allow a distributed lag up to L
n this where empirically we estimate that L is approximately 9, in
ther words it takes about a decade for the full effect of SWIFT to
lay out on bank performance. This was also generally conﬁrmed
y the people we interviewed in banks.cy 46 (2017) 984–1004 991
An econometric problem that arises while trying to estimate the
effects of technology adoption on ﬁrm performance is unobserved
heterogeneity. This occurs when there are many factors correlated
with ﬁrm performance that we do not measure. In our case, this may
create an upwards bias for the coefﬁcient of SWIFT. We  assume that
these unobserved factors stay constant over time and we treat them
as ﬁxed effects. Then we proceed with our estimation by including
a full set of ﬁrm-level dummy  variables (the within-groups esti-
mator). A problem with the ﬁxed effects estimator is that it will
exacerbate classical measurement error causing the SWIFT coefﬁ-
cient to be attenuated towards zero. But since this is administrative
data there is probably little measurement error. A second concern,
however, is that there may  still be unobserved shocks, so that SWIFT
adoption is correlated with the error term, εit .In the absence of an
instrumental variable it is difﬁcult to do much about this, but the
fact that the main effects come not from the current variables but
the long-lagged variables gives some reassurance that the positive
effects we identify are not due to endogeneity bias.
Finally, note that all standard errors are clustered by ﬁrm to
allow for arbitrary patterns of autocorrelation over time (serial cor-
relation is typical in ﬁrm panels even after removing ﬁxed effects).
6. Analysis and discussion of ﬁndings
In the next part of the paper we report on our analysis and dis-
cuss the implications of our results for the research questions in
our study. In the ﬁrst sub-section, we consider whether there is
evidence that ICT adoption generates long-term beneﬁts for banks
and whether these beneﬁts accumulate over time. The timeline
that is produced is important because whereas previous studies
rest on aggregated or cross sectional data, our ﬁndings are based
upon a longitudinal panel of data for a particular network technol-
ogy. Next, we  focus in more detail on whether particular kinds of
ﬁrms beneﬁt more than others in the long-term. Finally, we inves-
tigate the mechanisms through which SWIFT adoption adds value
to banks in the long-run and identify, among other things, network
effects to be of signiﬁcance. For each section we draw on insights
from prior in-depth ﬁeld studies, and discuss how we might inter-
pret the beneﬁts that we  have identiﬁed and their implications for
further research.
6.1. The long-term effects of SWIFT adoption
Table 3 reports our basic regression results using the speciﬁ-
cation in equation (1). Column (1) simply regresses proﬁtability
on a nine-year distributed lag of SWIFT adoption (all columns
include year and ﬁrm dummies). SWIFT appears to have a signiﬁ-
cant impact on ﬁrm proﬁtability for up to 9 years. Lags at ten years
and beyond were insigniﬁcant. As shown at the base of the col-
umn  the sum of the SWIFT coefﬁcients are signiﬁcantly different
from zero (p-value = 0.0018) and the coefﬁcients are jointly sig-
niﬁcant (p-value = 0.0006). The dynamics are interesting: there is
little effect, even a negative coefﬁcient in some of the early years
of SWIFT on proﬁts. The larger effects do not materialise for several
years. We  illustrate these dynamic effects in Fig. 4 which presents
the cumulative effect of SWIFT over time. The ﬁgure illustrates that
positive returns are not clearly visible until two years after SWIFT
adoption and only gradually build up the long-run effect of 0.0823,
which is sizeable.
Column (2) includes the capital-labor ratio as an additional
control, whose coefﬁcient is positive and highly signiﬁcant. The
dynamics are illustrated in Fig. 5 and show an even slower build-
up of proﬁt margins than the previous column – the long-run effect
falls to 0.07. Column (3) includes a lead in SWIFT to pick up whether
there were costs in the year prior to the “go-live” year of SWIFT
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Table 3
SWIFT adoption and ﬁrm Performance (Pre-Tax Proﬁts divided by Sales).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Sample All ﬁrms Small ﬁrms Large ﬁrms
Dependent variable /Sit /Sit /Sit /Sit /Sit
log
(
Assets
Employees
)
it
– 0.0358***
(0.0076)
0.0358***
(0.0076)
0.0543***
(0.013)
0.0268***
(0.0093)
SWIFTit+1 – – 0.0155
(0.0138)
– –
SWIFTit 0.0011
(0.0177)
0.0006
(0.0171)
−0.0087
(0.0162)
0.0012
(0.0273)
0.0023
(0.0216)
SWIFTit-1 −0.0087
(0.0205)
−0.0106
(0.0201)
−0.0102
(0.0201)
−0.0001
(0.0309)
−0.0187
(0.0261)
SWIFTit-2 0.0269*
(0.016)
0.0243
(0.0159)
0.0246
(0.0158)
0.0376
(0.0288)
0.0114
(0.0155)
SWIFTit-3 −0.0051
(0.0133)
−0.0057
(0.0132)
−0.0056
(0.0132)
0.0059
(0.023)
−0.0162
(0.014)
SWIFTit-4 0.0263**
(0.0113)
0.026**
(0.0112)
0.0262**
(0.0112)
0.0411**
(0.0173)
0.0105
(0.0141)
SWIFTit-5 0.038
(0.0108)
0.002
(0.0108)
0.002
(0.0108)
−0.0002
(0.0161)
0.0028
(0.0145)
SWIFTit-6 0.0057
(0.011)
0.0055
(0.011)
0.0055
(0.011)
0.0027
(0.0172)
0.0074
(0.0141)
SWIFTit-7 0.0105
(0.0104)
0.0098
(0.0104)
0.0098
(0.0104)
0.0147
(0.0171)
0.0062
(0.0132)
SWIFTit-8 0.0034
(0.0089)
0.0026
(0.0089)
0.0026
(0.0089)
−0.0015
(0.016)
0.0042
(0.0105)
SWIFTit-9 0.0184**
(0.0077)
0.0154**
(0.0076)
0.0155**
(0.0076)
0.0167
(0.0135)
0.0138
(0.009)
Long-Run impact of SWIFT (Sum of coefﬁcients) 0.0823 0.07 0.0618 0.1181 0.0238
Mean  of Dependent variable 0.1522 0.1522 0.1522 0.1382 0.1652
Signiﬁcance of the sum of SWIFT coef. (Prob > F) 0.0006 0.003 0.01 0.0024 0.4053
Joint  signiﬁcance of SWIFT coef. (Prob > F) 0.0018 0.0093 0.0096 0.0215 0.6004
Firm  ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of ﬁrms 5615 5615 5615 2832 2783
Number of obs. 29970 29970 29970 14300 15670
R2 0.6694 0.6726 0.6727 0.6622 0.6852
Notes: *signiﬁcant at 10%, **signiﬁcant at 5%, ***signiﬁcant at 1%. Standard errors in brackets are clustered by ﬁrm. All equations include a full set of country and year dummies.
The  dependent variable in all columns (/Sit) is the Proﬁt Margin denoting Pre-tax Proﬁts over Total Revenues (Sales). In all columns we  include a 9-year lag structure to test
the  long-term effect of SWIFT on ﬁrm performance. In column 3 we have also constructed a lead to investigate the causal direction of SWIFT adoption and ﬁrm performance.
In  columns 4 & 5, we  split our data between “Small” and “Big” ﬁrms we  use a mean of the Total Assets of each ﬁrm as size indicator to make the categorisation. The time
period  of our sample is 1998–2005 (eight years).
Fig. 4. Long-term returns from SWIFT. Notes: Fig. 4 is a graphical representation of column (1) in Table 3. It presents the long run effect of SWIFT adoption on Proﬁt Margin
in  the whole sample. Our full sample includes 6848 ﬁrms in 29 countries (adopters & non-adopters). Adoption data run from 1977 to 2006 and ﬁnancial data from 1998 to
2005.
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Fig. 5. Long-term returns from SWIFT (controlling for capital intensity). Notes: Fig. 5 is a graphical representation of column (2) in Table 3. It presents the long run effect of
SWIFT  adoption on Proﬁt Margin in the whole sample. Our full sample includes 6848 ﬁrms in 29 countries (adopters & non-adopters). Adoption data run from 1977 to 2006
and  ﬁnancial data from 1998 to 2005.
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Fig. 6). The coefﬁcient is insigniﬁcant and actually positive rather
han negative. This suggests either that the costs before the go-live
oint are insubstantial or that most of these are captured in the
ear when the go live period occurs (given that the implementation
eriod may  just be months). The ﬁrst three columns all suggest a
ositive long-run impact of SWIFT on performance of between 0.06
nd 0.08. Taking the lower bound, this is still an increase in prof-
tability of around 40% throughout the ten years of SWIFT adoption,
hich is large.9
9 The results are robust even when we  put in country dummy  and year dummy
nteractions (year*country) for all years and countries.on). Notes: Fig. 6 is a graphical representation of column (3) in Table 3. It presents
ple includes 6848 ﬁrms in 29 countries (adopters & non-adopters). Adoption data
The positive and statistically signiﬁcant effect of SWIFT adoption
on ﬁrm performance (measured in terms of proﬁt margin) is impor-
tant because it challenges the practitioner notion of “the plumbing”.
In other words, it overturns the prevalent assumption that adopt-
ing a network innovation like SWIFT is analogous to connecting
a neutral system of ‘pipes’ with little or no effect. Archival mate-
rial and interviews with practitioners involved in the founding of
SWIFT emphasised the effectiveness of its original mission to “kill
telex”, eliminate telegrams, and stop facsimiles. Having such an
easily communicated objective seems to have played a key role in
adoption providing historical insight for innovation strategists. As
for the focus of our study, rally cries to “kill telex” help us to under-
stand increases in efﬁciency but are there further insights from our
ﬁeld study that can speak to more generative mechanisms at work?
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As a ground-breaking network innovation, many problems were
ncountered not least of which was the realisation that multi-
urisdictional legal agreements would need to be drawn up if the
tatus of its international messaging systems was going to be rec-
gnized. What emerged was a “community of practice” (Wenger,
998) in which expertise of many kinds was pooled and made
ccessible to members. As one interviewee put it: “. . .the unique-
ess of SWIFT was and still is today the absolute impressive
ccessibility. . . The great idea behind SWIFT was that this would be
 platform for all ﬁnancial institutions and that its advantage terms
f cooperation should outweigh the individual beneﬁts”. Banks that
ere normally competitors sent their staff to inter-organizational
orkshops to collaboratively examine the technical challenges of
etwork innovation ranging from legal/regulatory issues, industry
tandards, process reengineering, organizational restructuring, and
ew approaches to management. A domino effect of process inno-
ation followed as SWIFT updates rolled out and legacy systems
ere replaced as part of the adoption process.
.2. Firm size and ﬁnancial performance
In columns (4) and (5) we repeat the analysis by splitting the
ample into larger and smaller ﬁrms based on median assets.10
he speciﬁcations are identical to column (2) and the dynamic
esponses are plotted in Figs. 7 and 8. The coefﬁcients are much
arger for smaller ﬁrms than bigger ones: smaller ﬁrms have a long-
un SWIFT effect of 0.12 whereas this is only 0.02 for larger ﬁrms.
ince the margins are larger for bigger ﬁrms the implied propor-
ionate effect is even greater for the small ﬁrms than the large ﬁrms.
 possible explanation for this is that the larger ﬁrms have to bear a
ot more re-organization costs because of their legacy proprietary
ystems. However, this does not explain the long-term difference
n performance resulting from SWIFT adoption.
In summary, and taking all columns together, we have two  key
esults. First, there seems to be a positive and statistically signif-
cant effect of SWIFT adoption on ﬁrm performance (measured in
erms of proﬁt margin), and this effect appears to be substantial in
agnitude. This is consistent with other recent ﬁndings on ICT and
rm performance. Secondly this effect is much higher on smaller
rms rather than big ﬁrms.
The result for small ﬁrms is important because by mapping this
riginal data set onto a timeline for adoption beneﬁts we  are not
nly able to contribute baseline ﬁndings to the scholarly knowl-
dge base but also raise a number of key questions for further
esearch. For example, going forward, do we need to differenti-
te between network technologies such as EDI and ATM (the focus
f prior literature) and network innovations which through their
embership associate small ﬁrms with a mode of governance, audit
nd accountability that would otherwise be out of reach? If as a
enior member of the executive team has suggested, SWIFT is “the
rst cloud”, can we claim that particular forms of network innova-
ion serve, as Lacity et al. (2014) suggest, as “a great equaliser for
MEs [providing] an unprecedented opportunity to access econom-
cally the same IT infrastructure and software as large-sized ﬁrms”?
oes SWIFT membership amplify small scale specialist offering
ith world-class infrastructure?
Our results mean we are also able to better reﬂect upon prac-
itioner claims that SWIFT was developed “by big banks, for big
10 Median assets were calculated using all available ﬁnancial data from 1998 to
005. The results largely stay the same if we  split our sample based on the number
f  employees instead of using total assets as a size indicator. In the Appendix A
e  also include a breakdown of our sample in terciles reporting ﬁgures for small,
edium and large banks (Table A9). The accumulative beneﬁt decreases as the size
f  the ﬁrms in the sample increase conﬁrming our initial ﬁndings that smaller ﬁrms
eneﬁt more from the adoption of SWIFT in the long-term.cy 46 (2017) 984–1004
banks”. Interviews with ‘SWIFT pioneers’ and founding members
indicate that small banks were integral to its formation.11 Accord-
ing to our analysis, if we take a long-term view of SWIFT adoption
we ﬁnd consistent and signiﬁcant evidence that small banks have
both beneﬁtted from SWIFT membership and been an asset to other
members in the SWIFT network.
6.3. Other outcomes: sales, expenses and labour
Table 4 presents the estimates of three other outcome variables:
ln(Sales), ln(costs) and ln(labor-capital ratio). As in the previous
tables, in all columns, we  control for ﬁrm ﬁxed effects and we
include a full set of country and year dummies. The dynamic
responses are graphically presented in Figs. 9–11.
Column (1) of Table 4 presents the sales equation. Sales are
positively and signiﬁcantly associated with SWIFT adoption: the
long-run effect of SWIFT on sales is 41 log points, implying the
ﬁrm sales increase by approximately 50% ( = [exp(0.407) − 1] × 100)
over the decade when SWIFT was  adopted. These results are con-
sistent with our prior qualitative ﬁndings that SWIFT creates new
revenue streams and results into an increase in sales.
The second column uses costs – operating expenses – as a depen-
dent variable. Controlling for assets, we ﬁnd that the ﬁrst two years’
expenses actually increase and start to decrease only from the
third year after adoption. The long-run effect is negatively corre-
lated with SWIFT adoption and is statistically signiﬁcant. The initial
increase the long-term decrease of the costs is consistent with our
story of how SWIFT affects ﬁrm operating expenses. While SWIFT in
various cases demands a considerable initial amount of investment
to implement and use, it substitutes different inputs that account
for a large piece of the operating costs. From the results, we can pre-
sume that operating costs fall by approximately 20% in the 10-year
period following SWIFT adoption. This is smaller than the pro-
portionate increase in revenues, suggesting that SWIFT increases
proﬁts both by reducing costs and increasing demand, but the effect
is stronger on revenues.
In column (3) we  use the ratio of employees over assets as a
dependent variable. There appears to be a substantial shakeout of
workers relative to capital following SWIFT adoption, presumably
because SWIFT enables reductions in manpower. The results here
are also statistically signiﬁcant.
The above ﬁndings suggest that the value-added mechanism
from SWIFT adoption does not only concern the reduction of
operating expenses (due to efﬁciencies) as one would expect
from the adoption of a production technology (Fuentelsaz et al.,
2012). Through the enhancement of banks’ communication capa-
bilities and the development of new standards, SWIFT provided the
opportunity to increase ﬁrms’ transactional capacity, develop new
products and services and create new markets that led to further
revenue gains. One of the interviewees at a small bank, which has
been back and forth with the decision to adopt SWIFT solely on the
basis of cost reductions, said “. . .then there was  a feedback from
our marketing effort, which said that we  would be able to increase
our business, increase our volume, if we have SWIFT.” Being a net-
work innovation, the beneﬁts from SWIFT adoption rely largely on
the number of network adopters that a bank is able to transact with
over the SWIFT network. In the next section, we  make an attempt
to identify any existing network effects that boost the marginal
beneﬁt of SWIFT adopters as the size of the network grows.
11 One described SWIFT’s approach to members at the time of its found as follows:
“.  . .everybody paid the same tariff and they paid the same entry fee, it was really,
you know, everybody’s on the same level, the small [local] bank [. . .] to the big U.S.
or big European bank”.
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Fig. 7. Long-term returns in small ﬁrms. Notes: Fig. 7 is a graphical representation of column (4) in Table 3. It presents the long run effect of SWIFT adoption on Proﬁt Margin
in  the sub-sample of Small ﬁrms. Our full sample includes 6848 ﬁrms in 29 countries (adopters & non-adopters). Adoption data run from 1977 to 2006 and ﬁnancial data
from  1998 to 2005.
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over time ﬁrms experience more than the straight forward replace-
ment of one technology (telex) with another (SWIFT). ‘Over time’ is
the key phrase here because we  show that network effects are notig. 8. Long-term returns in big ﬁrms. Notes: Fig. 8 is a graphical representation of 
n  the sub-sample of Big ﬁrms. Our full sample includes 6848 ﬁrms in 29 countries (
998  to 2005.
.4. SWIFT network externalities
In Table 5, we augment equation (1) to include a network vari-
ble deﬁned as the cumulated aggregate number of SWIFT adopters
n a country in a year from the entire SWIFT population. Columns
1) and (2) report the coefﬁcients for network effects and lagged
etwork effects respectively. In both columns we ﬁnd a positive
nd signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on the network variable. Even though
he coefﬁcients seem small, they suggest a considerable proﬁtabil-
ty effect if the number of the adopters increases rapidly every year
n each country. The literal interpretation of the current results is
hat, for every additional ﬁrm that adopts SWIFT in a speciﬁc coun-
ry, other adopters will increase their average proﬁt margin ratio
y approximately 0.0002. If the number of adopters for examplen (5) in Table 3. It presents the long run effect of SWIFT adoption on Proﬁt Margin
ers & non-adopters). Adoption data run from 1977 to 2006 and ﬁnancial data from
grows by 10 in a country in a year, ﬁrms are going to beneﬁt from
another 0.002 increase on their proﬁt margin (1.3%).12
Despite the challenges, we  can say that network effects were sig-
niﬁcant to some degree for every ﬁrm that adopts SWIFT. In other
words, every time a ﬁrm adopts SWIFT, other ﬁrms increase their
proﬁt margin. Taken with our other ﬁndings, it seems clear that12 The full network effects are hard to credibly estimate as many are international
rather than national. Unfortunately, the aggregate number of adopters is collinear
with the time dummies so cannot be separately identiﬁed.
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Table 4
SWIFT adoption and sales, expenses and labour capital.
(1) (2) (3)
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS
Dependent variable log(Sales)it log(Opex)it log
(
Employees
Assets
)
it
log(Assets)it – 0.633***
(0.031)
–
SWIFTit 0.0386
(0.0646)
0.0174
(0.0473)
−0.0162
(0.0468)
SWIFTit-1 0.1569**
(0.0714)
0.0219
(0.0395)
−0.0527
(0.0385)
SWIFTit-2 0.0813**
(0.0373)
−0.0217
(0.0249)
−0.0708**
(0.0278)
SWIFTit-3 0.0449
(0.0308)
−0.0473
(0.0303)
−0.0165
(0.0312)
SWIFTit-4 0.0605**
(0.0247)
−0.0146
(0.0249)
−0.0067
(0.0239)
SWIFTit-5 0.0064
(0.0247)
−0.0217
(0.024)
−0.0504*
(0.0293)
SWIFTit-6 −0.0078
(0.0271)
−0.0131
(0.0258)
−0.0043
(0.0298)
SWIFTit-7 −0.0095
(0.0239)
−0.0385*
(0.0221)
−0.0196
(0.0239)
SWIFTit-8 0.003
(0.0252)
−0.0102
(0.0202)
−0.0232
(0.0236)
SWIFTit-9 0.0327
(0.0338)
−0.0662***
(0.025)
−0.0846***
(0.0275)
Long-Run impact of SWIFT (Sum of coefﬁcients) 0.4072 −0.1939 −0.345
Mean  of Dependent variable (level) 653.6921 254.3271 −8.395
Signiﬁcance of the sum of SWIFT coef. (Prob > F) 0.0000 0.0023 0.0000
Joint  signiﬁcance of SWIFT coef. (Prob > F) 0.0022 0.0036 0.0007
Firm  ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Number of ﬁrms 6727 6720 5620
Number of obs. 39395 39259 30039
R2 0.9722 0.9822 0.9429
Notes: *signiﬁcant at 10%, **signiﬁcant at 5%, ***signiﬁcant at 1%. Standard errors in brackets are clustered by ﬁrm. All equations include a full set of country and year dummies.
The  dependent variable in column 1 is the log of total revenues, in column 2 the log of operating expenses, and in column 3 the log of employees over assets. The time period
is  1998–2005.
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eig. 9. SWIFT effect on total sales. Notes: Fig. 9 is a graphical representation of colum
Sales) of the ﬁrms of the whole sample. Our full sample includes 6848 ﬁrms in 29
n  Table 2. Adoption data run from 1977 to 2006 and ﬁnancial data from 1998 to 20
ome singular force of nature but rather that when network innova-
ions become industry standards their sustainability depends upon continued capacity to produce value for their members.
Returning to our ﬁndings about small ﬁrms above, the qualita-
ive data that we gathered is in line with evidence from Iacovou
t al. (1995) who  found that the primary reason for EDI adoption in Table 4. It presents the long run effect of SWIFT adoption on the Total Revenues
ries (adopters & non-adopters). Descriptive Statistics of our variables are reported
across small businesses is external pressure from trading partners
(especially larger institutions) seeking to reduce ongoing operat-
ing costs with counterparties (Kuan and Chau, 2001). As one of the
original SWIFT implementation team put it, “If you were not on
SWIFT but, you know, 25 other banks were, you were going to lose
the business, because the other banks who  were ‘on’ are not going
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Fig. 10. SWIFT effect on operating expenses.
Notes: Fig. 10 is a graphical representation of column (2) in Table 4. It presents the long run effect of SWIFT adoption on the Operating Expenses of the ﬁrms in the whole
sample.  Again we can observe the dynamic effect of SWIFT. According to our analyses on SWIFT, expenses are expected to increase the ﬁrst two  years of the technology
implementation. After that, operating expenses experience a drop since automates a list of processes in the organisations. Our full sample includes 6848 ﬁrms in 29 countries
(adopters & non-adopters). Descriptive Statistics of our variables are reported in Table 2. Adoption data run from 1977 to 2006 and ﬁnancial data from 1998 to 2005.
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he  assets of the ﬁrm sample. Our full sample includes 6848 ﬁrms in 29 countries (
doption data run from 1977 to 2006 and ﬁnancial data from 1998 to 2005.
o go back to sending telexes.” Complying with such pressure may
ave brought initial difﬁculties for small banks but over time they
eneﬁt from access to a wider range of potential clients with whom
hey can securely transact.
We  close our exploration of innovation adoption and network
ffects by posing a question for further research: does our study of
WIFT adoption suggest (following Bonardi and Durand, 2003) that
etwork effects can be managed? As one interviewee said when
sked about the active on-boarding of small bank members during
he early years of SWIFT adoption: “In general, during the develop-
ent period, the biggest support came from the small-to-medium
ize banks who always have been the pro SWIFT–If we had createdmn (3) in Table 4. Here we  observe a fall in the numbers of employees relatively to
ers & non-adopters). Description Statistics of our variables are reported in Table 2.
a SWIFT banking community and a non-SWIFT banking commu-
nity, the SWIFT banking community would have suffered as much
as the non-SWIFT banking community· · · I mean it’s like making a
road only for BMW’s, it doesn’t ﬁt, the philosophy is wrong.” Do our
ﬁndings about small ﬁrms and network effects point to the possi-
bility that relational governance has the potential to inﬂuence how
adoption beneﬁts evolve over time?7. Conclusion
In this paper, we  focus on the impact of ICT adoption on the per-
formance of ﬁrms in the ﬁnancial services sector using an original
998 S.V. Scott et al. / Research Poli
Table 5
SWIFT network effects.
(1) (2)
Estimation method OLS OLS
Sample All ﬁrms
Dependent variable /Sit /Sit
log(Assets)it 0.0362***
(0.0076)
0.0362***
(0.0076)
Network Effectjt 0.0001808***
(0.0000575)
–
Network Effectjt-1 – 0.0002741***
(0.0000547)
SWIFTit 0.001
(0.017)
0.0013
(0.017)
SWIFTit-1 −0.0102
(0.02)
−0.0107
(0.02)
SWIFTit-2 0.025
(0.0158)
0.025
(0.0158)
SWIFTit-3 −0.0053
(0.0132)
−0.0054
(0.0132)
SWIFTit-4 0.0264**
(0.0112)
0.0264**
(0.0112)
SWIFTit-5 0.0023
(0.0108)
0.0023
(0.0109)
SWIFTit-6 0.006
(0.011)
0.0061
(0.011)
SWIFTit-7 0.0106
(0.0103)
0.0108
(0.0104)
SWIFTit-8 0.0033
(0.0089)
0.0034
(0.0089)
SWIFTit-9 0.0176**
(0.0076)
0.0183**
(0.0076)
Long-Run impact of SWIFT (Sum of coefﬁcients) 0.0765 0.0776
Mean of Dependent variable 0.1517 0.1517
Signiﬁcance of the sum of SWIFT coef. (Prob > F) 0.0011 0.0009
Joint signiﬁcance of SWIFT coef. (Prob > F) 0.0027 0.0020
Firm ﬁxed effects Yes Yes
Number of ﬁrms 5615 5615
Number of obs. 29970 29970
R2 0.6730 0.6735
Notes: *signiﬁcant at 10%, **signiﬁcant at 5%, ***signiﬁcant at 1%. Standard errors
in  brackets are clustered by ﬁrm. All equations include a full set of country and
year dummies. The time period is 1998–2005. The Network Effect variable is the
aggregate number of SWIFT adopters by country j and per year t from 1977 to 2006.
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ﬁhe  Global stock variable is the accumulated number of SWIFT adopters globally
er annum. Global stock * SWIFTit is the interaction between Global stock and the
doption dummy  SWIFTit.
ataset from SWIFT, one of the ﬁrst and probably the most widely
sed network technologies in the banking world. SWIFT has been
art of the core ﬁnancial infrastructure for over 40 years; it pro-
ides global information processing services, transmits more than
0 million transaction messages a day, and effectively serves as the
orld’s most reliable third party network. Yet for most of its history
t has ‘ﬂown under the radar’. Most people will have a SWIFT code
n the corner of their bank account statement and many will have
sed it when making an international funds transfer but few know
nything about its founding, development, operations or impact.
Using an uncommonly rich longitudinal panel of data on 6848
anks in 29 countries in Europe and North America we construct
ong lags and investigate the dynamics characterizing the effect of
WIFT adoption on ﬁrm performance. We  provide robust evidence
hat SWIFT adoption has a positive and signiﬁcant association with
rm performance even after controlling for many factors, includ-cy 46 (2017) 984–1004
ing ﬁrm ﬁxed effects. Our main results show that the returns from
SWIFT can take up to ten years to be fully realised. As expected for
most technology investments, we observe an extremely weak or
negative result within the ﬁrst few years of the adoption of SWIFT.
This is consistent with the idea that it takes years to fully implement
technological and organizational changes and even longer for ﬁrms
to enjoy the beneﬁts of adopting these innovations. Additionally,
the proﬁtability effects of SWIFT derive mainly from an increase in
sales, not just a fall in long-term operating expenses (due to fewer
employees per unit of capital). We  believe that the most interesting
result to emerge from our analysis − beyond the positive impact on
performance (measured in terms of proﬁt margin) and evidence of
network effects − is the realisation that smaller ﬁrms beneﬁt from
relatively higher returns than the larger ones.
There are many outstanding issues and areas for further research
here which will intrigue scholars of ICT adoption, particularly those
specialising in ﬁnancial services. Using additional data from an in-
depth ﬁeld study, we explore potential generative mechanisms that
may  be implicated in the beneﬁts of adoption. We point to the
‘domino’ effect as SWIFT network innovations are enfolded into
“productive process advances” (Fuentelsaz et al., 2009; p.1174),
the value that access to a community of practices has for SME’s,
and SWIFT’s role as a non-state actor working with legislators to
write the legal terms for international business when gaps between
national jurisdictions were discovered. Aware that scholars are
interested in the speciﬁc characteristics of network innovations
in order to understand their distinctive strategic importance (Katz
and Shapiro, 1985; Farrell and Saloner, 1985), we note that SWIFT
is an industry cooperative. In other words, SWIFT was funded
and developed through voluntary action rather than being cre-
ated by regulatory instruction and as a mutual it rebates proﬁt
to its members each year. This leads us to ask not only whether
SWIFT membership provides (especially small ﬁrms) access with
a mode of governance, audit and accountability that would other-
wise be out of reach but also whether this points to the possibility of
using relational governance to manage network effects. Finally, we
overturn a number of assumptions about SWIFT in the practitioner
community. We  would suggest that it is important for ﬁnancial
services organizations not only to ‘know your customer’ but also
to ‘know thyself’. Our ﬁndings reinforce the need to explore, sub-
stantiate and then pursue evidence-based strategy when making
ICT investments in the evolving ﬁnancial services technoscape.
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Table  A1
SWIFT adoption and ﬁrm performance.
(1) (2) (3)
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS
Sample All ﬁrms
Dependent variable ROAit ROEit C/Iit
SWIFTit 0.0343
(0.0854)
−0.5141
(0.742)
0.7632
(3.9223)
SWIFTit-1 −0.1119
(0.0971)
−0.8495
(0.7396)
−1.3863
(4.7286)
SWIFTit-2 0.0223
(0.085)
0.5512
(0.6489)
−5.6947
(4.633)
SWIFTit-3 0.023
(0.0782)
0.2414
(0.6768)
−0.51
(4.0055)
SWIFTit-4 0.139*
(0.0737)
0.9697
(0.611)
−3.0426
(3.0944)
SWIFTit-5 0.0035
(0.0706)
0.1633
(0.6274)
2.1921
(2.518)
SWIFTit-6 0.0418
(0.0643)
−0.1904
(0.5242)
−1.6541
(3.178)
SWIFTit-7 0.0445
(0.0618)
0.5961
(0.5321)
−0.7196
(1.8542)
SWIFTit-8 0.0055
(0.0621)
−0.3878
(0.5107)
−2.2
(1.3238)
SWIFTit-9 0.0236
(0.0619)
0.5366
(0.5092)
−1.6793
(1.4007)
Long-Run impact of SWIFT (Sum of coefﬁcients) 0.2257 1.1165 −13.9313
Mean  of Dependent variable 0.7751 8.3774 68.149
Signiﬁcance of the sum of SWIFT coef. (Prob > F) 0.1238 0.3507 0.0023
Joint  signiﬁcance of SWIFT coef. (Prob > F) 0.4117 0.3680 0.1101
Firm  ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Number of ﬁrms 6754 6739 6624
Number of obs. 39661 39602 38785
R2 0.6258 0.6052 0.5830
Notes: *signiﬁcant at 10%, **signiﬁcant at 5%, ***signiﬁcant at 1%. Standard errors in brackets are clustered by ﬁrm. All equations include a full set of country and year dummies.
The  dependent variable in column 1 is Return on Assets, in column 2 Return on Equity, and in column 3 Cost to Income Ratio. The time period is 1998–2005.
Table  A2
Deﬁnition of measures.
Measures Ratio Description
Performance
Proﬁt Margin Pretax Income/Sales (PCM) Increase in PCM indicates higher Proﬁts generated by Sales
Return on Assets Pretax Income/Assets (ROA) Increase in ROA indicates higher Proﬁts generated by Assets
Return on Equity Pretax Income/Equity (ROE) Increase in ROE indicates higher Proﬁts generated by Equity
Efﬁciency
Cost  to Income Operating Expenses (OPEX)/Operating Income Efﬁciency Inverse Ratio: the higher the ratio, the worse the perceived efﬁciency
Notes: This table includes the deﬁnitions of the main ratios that we  use in our analysis. We have categorized them into two distinct groups: Performance measures and
Efﬁciency measures. Performance ratios measure the returns of SWIFT, whereas, efﬁciency ratios measure the costs behaviour of the banks relative to their Proﬁts and Assets.
Efﬁciency ratios are both inverse ratios.
Table A3
Descriptive statistics on SWIFT adopters.
Mean Size (Total Assets in millions$) Mean Proﬁt Margin Number of Adopters Number of Firms
SWIFT adopters
early 1977–1999 22200 0.1648 1108
late  2000–2006 9459.479 0.134 263
In  our sample
1998–2005 10100 0.1352 329
1998–1999 9519.264 0.1546 98
2000–2005 10400 0.1264 231
Non-adopters
whole sample 5945.563 0.1496 5159
Notes: Sample includes 6848 ﬁrms in 29 countries, from 1998 to 2005; millions$ = Millions of US Dollars. Figures reported here are the ones used in the regressions in Table
A IFT ad
t
h4.  In total 6530 ﬁrms are being utilized by the regressions from which 1371 are SW
hat  adopted SWIFT before 2000 are bigger in size than ﬁrms that adopted SWIFT after 20
owever, these are not necessarily the least proﬁtable in terms of Proﬁt Margins.opters (1108 + 263), and 5159 are non-adopters. We can observe that early adopters
00. The smallest ﬁrms in our sample are the ones that haven’t adopted SWIFT yet,
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Table A4
SWIFT adoption and ﬁrm performance − robustness checks.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS
Sample All ﬁrms SWIFT adopters
Dependent variable /Sit /Sit /Sit /Sit
log
(
Assets
Employees
)
it
0.0404***
(0.0084)
– 0.0509***
(0.0098)
–
log(Assets)it – 0.0119*
(0.0066)
– 0.0133
(0.0098)
SWIFTit 0.0014
(0.0168)
−0.0023
(0.0153)
−0.0012
(0.017)
−0.0052
(0.0155)
SWIFTit-1 −0.0015
(0.0191)
−0.0054
(0.0178)
−0.0106
(0.02)
−0.0052
(0.0177)
SWIFTit-2 0.0172
(0.0157)
0.0133
(0.0141)
0.0227
(0.0158)
0.012
(0.0141)
SWIFTit-3 −0.0073
(0.0125)
0.0072
(0.0121)
−0.0069
(0.0133)
0.0055
(0.0122)
SWIFTit-4 0.0206*
(0.0112)
0.0184*
(0.0104)
0.025**
(0.0112)
0.017
(0.0105)
SWIFTit-5 0.0015
(0.01)
0.001
(0.0106)
0.0015
(0.0109)
0.0009
(0.0106)
SWIFTit-6 0.0032
(0.0095)
0.0028
(0.0103)
0.0056
(0.011)
0.0021
(0.0104)
SWIFTit-7 0.0027
(0.0098)
0.0096
(0.0096)
0.0086
(0.0104)
0.0081
(0.0097)
SWIFTit-8 0.0009
(0.009)
0.0098
(0.0093)
0.0028
(0.0091)
0.0093
(0.0093)
SWIFTit-9 0.0167**
(0.0077)
0.013
(0.0083)
0.0128
(0.0079)
0.0107
(0.0086)
Long-Run impact of SWIFT (Sum of coefﬁcients) 0.0555 0.0672 0.0604 0.0554
Mean  of Dependent variable 0.1522 0.1517 0.1593 0.1584
Signiﬁcance of the sum of SWIFT coef. (Prob > F) 0.0155 0.0020 0.0274 0.0296
Joint  signiﬁcance of SWIFT coef. (Prob > F) 0.2009 0.0299 0.1387 0.3271
Firm  ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of ﬁrms 5615 6727 1371 1642
Number of obs. 29970 39393 7320 9357
R2 0.6919 0.6778 0.6337 0.6271
Notes: *signiﬁcant at 10%, **signiﬁcant at 5%, ***signiﬁcant at 1%. In this table we perform some robustness check on the relationship between SWIFT adoption and ﬁrm
performance. Standard errors in brackets are robust to heteroskedacity and autocorrelation of unknown form and are clustered by ﬁrm. All equations include a full set of
country and year dummies and in column 1 their interaction. In all columns we include a 9-year lag structure to test the long-run effect of SWIFT on ﬁrm performance. We
test  our data using the whole sample (col. 1 and 2), and SWIFT adopters sample (col. 3 and 4).
Table A5
SWIFT adoption and ﬁrm performance − robustness checks.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Sample Commercial Banks Non-Commercial Banks Selection of Banks
Dependent variable /Sit /Sit /Sit /Sit /Sit /Sit
log
(
Assets
Employees
)
it
0.0395***
(0.013)
– 0.0319***
(0.0088)
– 0.0391***
(0.009)
–
log(Assets)it – 0.0137
(0.01)
– 0.0098
(0.0089)
– 0.016**
(0.0076)
SWIFTit 0.0005
(0.0261)
−0.0076
(0.0235)
−0.001
(0.0207)
−0.0004
(0.0179)
−0.0086
(0.0209)
−0.0103
(0.0184)
SWIFTit-1 −0.0052
(0.0255)
−0.0041
(0.0234)
−0.0194
(0.0332)
−0.0085
(0.0277)
−0.0205
(0.0241)
−0.0166
(0.0209)
SWIFTit-2 0.0209
(0.0175)
0.0116
(0.0166)
0.0273
(0.0308)
0.0108
(0.0255)
0.0287
(0.0181)
0.0163
(0.016)
SWIFTit-3 −0.0043
(0.0165)
0.012
(0.0158)
−0.0141
(0.0208)
−0.0089
(0.0172)
−0.0096
(0.0146)
0.0072
(0.0136)
SWIFTit-4 0.0319**
(0.0137)
0.0235**
(0.0128)
0.0055
(0.0181)
0.0005
(0.018)
0.0327***
(0.0117)
0.0241**
(0.0112)
SWIFTit-5 0.0000
(0.0137)
−0.0018
(0.0134)
0.0018
(0.0156)
0.0017
(0.0169)
−0.0013
(0.0117)
−0.0005
(0.0114)
SWIFTit-6 0.0116
(0.0127)
0.0112
(0.0131)
−0.014
(0.0211)
−0.0193
(0.0164)
0.0063
(0.0111)
0.0057
(0.0108)
SWIFTit-7 0.0191
(0.0117)
0.0122
(0.0113)
−0.0171
(0.0213)
−0.0037
(0.0181)
0.0087
(0.0105)
0.0053
(0.0099)
SWIFTit-8 −0.0014
(0.0107)
0.005
(0.0109)
0.0044
(0.0161)
0.0125
(0.0176)
−0.0004
(0.0094)
0.006
(0.0093)
SWIFTit-9 0.0171*
(0.0092)
0.0175*
(0.0098)
0.0041
(0.0139)
−0.0059
(0.0155)
0.0153*
(0.0082)
0.0195**
(0.0086)
S.V. Scott et al. / Research Policy 46 (2017) 984–1004 1001
Table  A5 (Continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Sample Commercial Banks Non-Commercial Banks Selection of Banks
Dependent variable /Sit /Sit /Sit /Sit /Sit /Sit
Long-Run impact of SWIFT (Sum of coefﬁcients) 0.0902 0.0796 −0.0225 −0.0211 0.0513 0.0567
Mean  of Dependent variable 0.1717 0.1629 0.1445 0.1474 0.1601 0.1554
Signiﬁcance of the sum of SWIFT coef. (Prob > F) 0.0045 0.0085 0.5608 0.5222 0.0507 0.0193
Joint  signiﬁcance of SWIFT coef. (Prob > F) 0.0059 0.0460 0.9422 0.9811 0.0110 0.0170
Firm  ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of ﬁrms 1565 1910 4050 4817 3903 4659
Number of obs. 8516 10840 21454 28553 21272 27516
R2 0.6552 0.6452 0.6829 0.6165 0.6625 0.6575
Notes: *signiﬁcant at 10%, **signiﬁcant at 5%, ***signiﬁcant at 1%. In this table we  perform some robustness check on the relationship between SWIFT adoption and ﬁrm
performance. Standard errors in brackets are robust to heteroskedacity and autocorrelation of unknown form and are clustered by ﬁrm. All equations include a full set of
country  and year dummies and in column 1 their interaction. In all columns we include a 9-year lag structure to test the long-run effect of SWIFT on ﬁrm performance.
We  test our data using Commercial Banks sample (col. 1 and 2), Non-Commercial Banks and other ﬁnancial institutions sample (col. 3 and 4), and a selection of Financial
Institutions1 (col. 5 and 6).
Table A6
SWIFT adoption and ﬁrm performance − robustness checks.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS
Sample All ﬁrms All ﬁrms
Dependent variable /Sit /Sit /Sit /Sit
log
(
Assets
Employees
)
it
0.023** (0.009) – – –
log
(
Assets
Employees
)
it−1
0.0149**
(0.0073)
– 0.0247***
(0.0076)
–
log(Assets)it – −0.0008
(0.009)
– –
log(Assets)it-1 – 0.0011
(0.0073)
– 0.0007
(0.0073)
SWIFTit 0.0113
(0.0214)
0.008
(0.0171)
0.0115
(0.0214)
0.0079
(0.0171)
SWIFTit-1 −0.025
(0.0243)
−0.016
(0.019)
−0.0274
(0.024)
−0.0161
(0.019)
SWIFTit-2 0.0127
(0.0199)
0.009
(0.0164)
0.016
(0.0191)
0.0091
(0.0164)
SWIFTit-3 0.004
(0.0143)
0.0093
(0.0135)
0.0028
(0.014)
0.0093
(0.0135)
SWIFTit-4 0.0238**
(0.0107)
0.0191*
(0.011)
0.0172
(0.0113)
0.019*
(0.011)
SWIFTit-5 0.0053
(0.0104)
0.0061
(0.0106)
0.0117
(0.0109)
0.0061
(0.0105)
SWIFTit-6 −0.0029
(0.0109)
−0.0081
(0.0105)
−0.0074
(0.0106)
0.0081
(0.0105)
SWIFTit-7 0.0078
(0.0109)
0.0086
(0.0098)
0.0115
(0.0107)
−0.0085
(0.0098)
SWIFTit-8 −0.0043
(0.0092)
0.0012
(0.009)
−0.005
(0.0093)
0.0012
(0.009)
SWIFTit-9 0.0144
(0.0088)
0.0087
(0.0095)
0.0135
(0.0087)
0.0087
(0.095)
Long-Run impact of SWIFT (Sum of coefﬁcients) 0.0471 0.0458 0.0443 0.0457
Mean  of Dependent variable 0.1582 0.1545 0.1554 0.1545
Signiﬁcance of the sum of SWIFT coef. (Prob > F) 0.0859 0.0652 0.1134 0.065
Joint  signiﬁcance of SWIFT coef. (Prob > F) 0.1023 0.3932 0.1338 0.391
Firm  ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of ﬁrms 5061 6504 5253 6504
Number of obs. 23347 32554 24746 32554
R2 0.7054 0.6938 0.6956 0.6938
N
p
otes: *signiﬁcant at 10%, **signiﬁcant at 5%, ***signiﬁcant at 1%. In this table we  perfor
erformance. Standard errors in brackets are robust to heteroskedacity and autocorrelatim some robustness check on the relationship between SWIFT adoption and ﬁrm
on of unknown form and are clustered by ﬁrm.
1002 S.V. Scott et al. / Research Policy 46 (2017) 984–1004
Table A7
Bank specialisations in the sample.
Bank Specialisations Number of Firms SWIFT Adopters (ﬁrms) SWIFT Non-adopters (ﬁrms)
Bank Holding & Holding Companiesa 717 38 679
Central Banks 28 27 1
Commercial Banksa 1927 1034 893
Cooperative Banksa 1620 87 1533
Investment Banks/Securities Housesa 498 226 272
Islamic  Banks 1 1 0
Medium & Long Term Credit Banks 48 18 30
Multi-lateral Governmental Banks 2 1 1
Non-banking Credit Institutions 463 52 411
Real  Estate/Mortgage Banks 189 31 158
Savings  Banks 1280 138 1142
Specialised Governmental Credit Institutions 75 36 39
6848 1689 5159
Notes: Sample includes 6848 ﬁrms (205,440 observations) in 29 countries, from 1977 to 2006.
a These banks are included in the sample for columns (5) and (6) in Table A5.
Table A8
SWIFT early and late adopters.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Sample All ﬁrms Years ≤2001 Years ≥2002
Type of SWIFT adopters Early Early Late All All
Dependent variable /Sit /Sit /Sit /Sit /Sit
log
(
Assets
Employees
)
it
0.029***
(0.0078)
0.0297***
(0.0078)
0.0351***
(0.01)
0.0283***
(0.0098)
0.044***
(0.0169)
SWIFTit −0.0096
(0.0245)
−0.0105
(0.0245)
−0.0014
(0.0194)
−0.0046
(0.0258)
0.0148
(0.0351)
SWIFTit-1 −0.0069
(0.0247)
−0.0078
(0.0247)
−0.0206
(0.0272)
−0.0047
(0.0192)
−0.0158
(0.0425)
SWIFTit-2 −0.0024
(0.0205)
−0.0037
(0.0205)
0.0439*
(0.023)
0.0024
(0.0202)
0.0592*
(0.0345)
SWIFTit-3 −0.0155
(0.0185)
−0.017
(0.0185)
0.0134
(0.0155)
0.0071
(0.016)
0.0075
(0.0184)
SWIFTit-4 0.0278*
(0.0146)
0.0269*
(0.0146)
0.035*
(0.0181)
0.0149
(0.0181)
0.0692***
(0.0214)
SWIFTit-5 0.0042
(0.0121)
0.0172
(0.0107)
0.0102
(0.0213)
0.0339*
(0.0187)
−0.0025
(0.0166)
SWIFTit-6 0.0084
(0.0112)
0.0143
(0.0186)
0.0018
(0.0198)
SWIFTit-7 0.0093
(0.0104)
0.022
(0.0206)
0.0033
(0.0138)
SWIFTit-8 0.0024
(0.0089)
0.0291
(0.0202)
−0.0082
(0.0097)
SWIFTit-9 0.0157**
(0.0076)
0.0073
(0.0155)
0.0072
(0.0131)
Long-Run impact of SWIFT (Sum of coefﬁcients) 0.0335 0.005 0.0806 0.1216 0.1366
Mean  of Dependent variable 0.1531 0.1386 0.1491 0.1406 0.1616
Signiﬁcance of the sum of SWIFT coef. (Prob > F) 0.4066 0.8986 0.0087 0.0122 0.0414
Joint  signiﬁcance of SWIFT coef. (Prob > F) 0.0405 0.0915 0.0647 0.2090 0.1089
Firm  ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of ﬁrms 5352 5352 4507 4233 5260
Number of obs. 28654 28654 23966 13354 16616
R2 0.6729 0.6725 0.6903 0.7725 0.7775
Notes: *signiﬁcant at 10%, **signiﬁcant at 5%, ***signiﬁcant at 1%. In this table we  investigate the SWIFT-effects in two separate sub-samples: early SWIFT adopters (from 1977
t umn 3
o
ﬁo  1999) in columns 1 and 2, and late SWIFT adopters (from 2000 to 2006) in col
bservations prior 2002 and after 2002 respectively. Standard errors in brackets are rob
rm.  All equations include a full set of country and year dummies.. In columns 4 and 5 we run two additional regressions using a sample of all the
ust to heteroskedacity and autocorrelation of unknown form and are clustered by
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Table  A9
Small and large ﬁrms in terciles.
(1) (2) (3)
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS
Dependent variable /Sit
Firm size Small Q1 Medium Q2 Large Q3
log
(
Assets
Employees
)
it
0.0750***
(0.0200)
0.0285***
(0.0086)
0.0239**
(0.0118)
SWIFTit −0.0291
(0.0348)
0.0048
(0.0312)
0.0204
(0.0228)
SWIFTit-1 −0.0174
(0.0403)
0.0284
(0.0417)
−0.0305
(0.0258)
SWIFTit-2 0.0605
(0.0373)
0.0121
(0.0292)
0.0003
(0.0173)
SWIFTit-3 0.0102
(0.0314)
−0.0129
(0.0215)
−0.0159
(0.0165)
SWIFTit-4 0.0684***
(0.0239)
0.0096
(0.0178)
0.0179
(0.0162)
SWIFTit-5 0.0023
(0.0244)
0.0147
(0.0170)
−0.0123
(0.0158)
SWIFTit-6 −0.0149
(0.0299)
0.0065
(0.0151)
0.0188
(0.0161)
SWIFTit-7 0.0059
(0.0268)
0.0393**
(0.0155)
−0.0183
(0.0152)
SWIFTit-8 0.0042
(0.0257)
−0.0134
(0.0138)
0.0165
(0.0103)
SWIFTit-9 0.0259**
(0.0214)
−0.0018
(0.0109)
0.0173
(0.0107)
Long-Run impact of SWIFT (Sum of coefﬁcients) 0.2069 0.0711 0.0142
Mean  of Dependent variable 0.1400 0.1475 0.1682
Signiﬁcance of the sum of SWIFT coef. (Prob > F) 0.0090 0.0442 0.6731
Joint  signiﬁcance of SWIFT coef. (Prob > F) 0.0103 0.0436 0.6071
Firm  ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Number of ﬁrms 1827 1982 1807
Number of obs. 8464 11672 9842
R2 0.6473 0.6866 0.6936
N lit our
t eriod
h l equa
1
A
A
A
A
A
A
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
Botes: *signiﬁcant at 10%, **signiﬁcant at 5%, ***signiﬁcant at 1%. In this table we sp
he  Total Assets of each ﬁrm as size indicator to make the categorisation. The time p
eteroskedacity and autocorrelation of unknown form and are clustered by ﬁrm. Al
.10 References
ghion, Philippe, Howitt, Peter, 2007. Capital, innovation, and growth accounting.
Oxford Rev. Econ. Policy 23 (1), 79–93.
lpar, Paul, Kim, Moshe, 1990. A microeconomic approach to the measurement of
information technology value. J. Manag. Inf. Syst. 7 (2), 55–69.
nderson, Mark C., Banker, Rajiv D., Ravindran, Sury, 2006. Value implications of
investments in information technology. Manage. Sci. 52 (9), 1359–1376.
ral, Sinan, Weill, Peter, 2007. IT assets, organizational capabilities, and ﬁrm
performance: how resource allocations and organizational differences explain
performance variation. Organ. Sci. 18 (5), 763–780.
ral, Sinan, Brynjolfsson, Erik, Wu,  D.J., 2006. Which came ﬁrst, IT of productivity?
the virtuous cycle of investment and use in enterprise systems. In: In
Proceedings of the 27th International Conference on Information Systems,
Milwaukee, pp. 1–22.
utor, David H., Levy, Frank, Murnane, Richard J., 2002. Upstairs, downstairs:
computers and skills on two  ﬂoors of a large bank. Ind. Labor Relat. Rev. 55,
432–447.
IS, 2002. Statistics on Payment Systems in the Group of Ten Countries. Basel.
aily, Martin Neil, 1986. What has happened to productivity growth? Science 234,
443–451.
allantine, J., Levy, M.,  Powel, P., 1998. Evaluating information systems in small and
medium-sized enterprises: issues and evidence. Eur. J. Inf. Syst. 7, 241–251.
arrett, M.,  Walsham, G., 1999. Electronic trading and work transformation in the
London insurance market. Inf. Syst. Res. 10 (1), 1–22.
arua A., Kriebel C., Mukhopadhyay T., 1991. Information Technology and Business
Value: An Analytic and Empirical Investigation. University of Texas at Austin
Working Paper May.
attisti, G., Canepa, A., Stoneman, Paul, 2009. E-business usage across and within
ﬁrms in the UK: proﬁtability, externalities and policy. Res. Policy 38, 133–143.
eccalli, Elena, 2007. Does IT investment improve bank performance? evidence
from Europe. J. Bank. Finance 31 (7), 2205–2230.
erndt, Ernst R., Morrison, Catherine J., 1995. High-tech capital formation and
economic performance in U.S. manufacturing industries: an exploratory
analysis. J. Econ. 65, 9–43.loom, Nicholas, Sadun, Raffaella, Van Reenen, John, 2012. Americans do it better:
US multinationals and the productivity miracle. Am.  Econ. Rev. 102 (1),
167–201.
onardi, J.P., Durand, R., 2003. Managing network effects in high-tech markets.
Acad. Manage. Exec. 17 (4), 40–52. data in terciles between “Small”, “Medium” and “Large” ﬁrms. We use a mean of
 of our sample is 1998–2005 (eight years). Standard errors in brackets are robust to
tions include a full set of country and year dummies.
Bresnahan, Timothy F., Brynjolfsson, Erik, Hitt, Lorin M.,  2002. Information
technology, workplace organization and the demand for skilled labor. Q. J.
Econ. 117 (1), 339–376.
Brynjolfsson, Erik, Hitt, Lorin M.,  1993. Is information systems spending
productive? new evidence and new results. In: In The Proceedings of the 14th
International Conference on Information Systems, Orlando, FL.
Brynjolfsson, Erik, Hitt, Lorin M.,  1995. Computers as a factor of production: the
role of differences among ﬁrms. Econ. Innov. New Technol. 3 (3), 183–199.
Brynjolfsson, Erik, Hitt, Lorin M.,  1996. Paradox lost? ﬁrm-level evidence on the
returns to information systems spending. Manage. Sci. 42 (4), 541–558.
Brynjolfsson, Erik, Hitt, Lorin M.,  1998. Beyond the productivity paradox. Commun.
ACM 41 (8), 49–55.
Brynjolfsson, E., Hitt, L.M., 2000. Beyond computation: information technology,
organizational transformation and business performance. J. Econ. Perspect. 14
(4), 23–48.
Brynjolfsson, Erik, Hitt, Lorin M.,  2003. Computing productivity: ﬁrm-level
evidence. Rev. Econ. Stat. 85 (4), 793–808.
Brynjolfsson, Erik, Yang, Shinkyu, 1996. Information technology and productivity:
a  review of the literature. Adv. Comput. 43, 179–214.
Brynjolfsson, Erik, Malone, T.W., Gurvaxani, V., Kambil, A., 1994. Does information
technology lead to smaller ﬁrms? Manage. Sci. 40 (12), 1628–1644.
Brynjolfsson, Erik, 1993. The productivity paradox of information technology.
Commun. ACM 36 (12), 66–77.
Cainelli, G., Evangelista, R., Savona, M.,  2006. Innovation and economic
performance in services: a ﬁrm-level analysis. Camb. J. Econ. 30, 435–458.
Carr, Nicholas G., 2003. IT doesn’t matter. Harv. Bus. Rev., 41–49.
Casolaro, Luca, Gobbi, Giorgio, 2007. Information technology and productivity
changes in the banking industry. Econ. Notes 36 (1), 43–76.
Clemons, Eric K., Kimbrough, Steven O., 1986. Information systems,
telecommunications, and their effects on industrial organization. In
Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference on Information Systems,
99–108.
Clemons, Eric K., Row, M.,  1991. Sustaining IT advantage: the role of structural
differences. MIS Q. 15 (3), 274–292.
Clemons, Eric K., Weber, Bruce W.,  1990. London’s big bang: a case study of
information technology, competitive impact, and organizational change. J.
Manage. Inf. Syst. 6 (4), 41–60.
Clemons, Erik K., 1986. Information systems for sustainable competitive
advantage. Inf. Manage. 11, 131–136.
1 h Poli
C
C
D
D
D
D
E
E
F
I
F
F
P
G
G
G
G
G
H
H
H
H
I
J
J
K
K
K
K
L
O
Wenger, E., 1998. Communities of Practice: Learning, Meaning, and Identity.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Winder, R., 1985. Too SWIFT for Comfort. Euromoney January: 55–56.
Zuboff, Shoshanna, 1988. In the Age of the Smart Machine: The Future of Work and004 S.V. Scott et al. / Researc
ragg, P., King, M.,  1993. Small-Firm computing: motivators and inhibitors. MIS Q.
17  (1), 47–60.
urrie, W.,  Parikh, M.,  2006. Value creation in web services: an integrative model.
The J. Strategic Inf. Syst. 15 (2), 153–174.
avid, Paul A., 1990. The dynamo and the computer: a historical perspective on the
modern productivity paradox. Am.  Econ. Rev. 80 (2), 35–61.
ewan, Sanjeev, Kraemer, Kenneth L., 2000. Information technology and
productivity: evidence from country-level data. Manage. Sci. 46 (4), 548–562.
os Santos, B., Peffers, K., 1995. Rewards to investors in innovative information
technology applications: ﬁrst movers and early followers in ATMs. Organ. Sci.
6,  241–259.
raca, Mirko, Sadun, Raffaella, Van Reenen, John, 2007. Productivity and ICT: a
review of the evidence. In: Mansell, R., Avgerou, C., Quah, D., Silverstone, R.
(Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Information and Communication Technologies.
Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 100–147.
conomides, Nicholas, 1996. The economics of networks. Int. J. Ind Organ. 14 (6),
673–699.
vangelista, R., 2000. Sectoral patterns of technological change in services. Econ.
Innov. New Technol. 9, 183–221.
arrell, Joseph, Saloner, Garth, 1985. Standardization, compatibility, and
innovation. RAND J. Econ. 16 (1), 70.
nstalled base and compatibility: innovation, product preannouncements, and
predation., 1992. Am.  Econ. Rev. 76, 940–955.
rame, Scott W.,  White, Lawrence J., 2004. Empirical studies of ﬁnancial
innovation: lots of talk, little action? J. Econ. Lit. 42 (1), 116–144.
uentelsaz, Lucio, Gómez, Jaime, Palomas, Sergio, 2009. The effects of new
technologies on productivity: an intraﬁrm diffusion-based assessment. Res.
Policy 38 (7), 1172–1180.
roduction technologies and ﬁnancial performance: the effect of uneven diffusion
among competitors., 2012. Res. Policy 41 (2), 401–413.
eroski, Paul, Machin, Steve, Van Reenen, John, 1993. The proﬁtability of
innovating ﬁrms. RAND J. Econ. 24 (2), 198–211.
ordon, Robert J., 2016. The Rise and Fall of Economic Growth: The U.S. Standard
of Living Since the Civil War. Princeton University Press, NJ.
randon, Elizabeth E., Pearson, J. Michael, 2004. Electronic commerce adoption: an
empirical study of small and medium US businesses. Inf. Manage. 42 (1),
197–216.
riliches, Zvi, 1995. Comments on measurement issues in relating IT expenditures
to  productivity growth. Econ. Innov. New Technol. 3, 317–321.
ust, Christopher, Marquez, Jaime, 2004. International comparisons of
productivity growth: the role of information technology and regulatory
practices. Labour Econ. 1 (1), 33–58.
all, M.,  Weiss, L.W., 1967. Firm size and proﬁtability. Rev. Econ. Stat. 49 (8),
319–331.
annan, Timothy H., McDowell, John M.,  1984. The determinants of technology
adoption: the case of the banking ﬁrm. RAND J. Econ. 15 (3), 328–335.
annan, Timothy H., McDowell, John M.,  1987. Rival precedence and the dynamics
of  technology adoption: an empirical analysis. Economica 54 (214), 155–171.
aynes, Michelle, Thompson, Steve, 2000. The productivity impact of IT
deployment: an empirical evaluation of ATM introduction. Oxf. Bull. Econ. Stat.
62  (5), 607–619.
acovou, Charalambos L., Benbasat, Izak, Dexter, Albert S., 1995. Electronic data
interchange and small organizations: adoption and impact of technology. MIS
Q.  19 (4), 465.
orgenson, Dale W.,  Stiroh, Kevin, 1995. Computers and growth. Econ. Innov. New
Technol. 3, 295–316.
un, Sangjoon, 2008. The link between IT investment and securities ﬁrms’ returns
in  korea. J. Econ. Res. 13, 1–43.
atz, Michael L., Shapiro, Carl, 1985. Network externalities, competition, and
compatibility. Am.  Econ. Rev. 75 (3), 424–440.
retschmer, Tobias, 2012. Information and Communication Technologies and
Productivity Growth: A Survey of the Literature. OECD Digital Economy Papers
No. 195: 1–27.
uan, K., Chau, P., 2001. A perception-based model of EDI adoption in small
businesses using technology–organization–environment framework. Inf.
Manage. 38 (8), 507–521.
won, M.J., Stoneman, Paul, 1995. The impact of technology adoption on ﬁrm
productivity. Econ. Innov. New Technol., 219–233.acity M.C., Reynolds P., Khan S., Willcocks L., 2014. Cloud Services: The Great
Equalizer for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises? The Outsourcing Unit
Working Research Paper Series, LSE Paper 14/1.
liner, Stephen D., Sichel, Daniel E., 1994. Computers and output growth revisited:
how big is the puzzle? Brook. Pap. Econ. Act. 2, 273–334.cy 46 (2017) 984–1004
The resurgence of growth in the late 1990: is information technology the story?,
2000. J. Econ. Perspect. 14 (4), 3–22.
Oulton, N., 2002. ICT and productivity growth in the UK. Oxf. Rev. Econ. Policy 18
(3), 363–379.
Parsons, Gotlieb, Denny, 1993. Productivity and computers in Canadian banking. J.
Prod. Anal., 95–114.
Pfeiffer, H.K.C., 1992. The Diffusion of Electronic Data Interchange. Springer-Verlag,
New York, NY.
Raymond, Louis., 1985. Organizational characteristics and MIS  success in the
context of small business. MIS Q. 9 (1), 37–52.
Roach, Stephen S., 1991. Services under siege: the restructuring imperative. Harv.
Bus. Rev. 39 (September–October) (2), 82–92.
Romer, Paul M.,  1990. Endogenous technological change. J. Polit. Econ. 98 (5),
71–102.
Saloner, Garth, Shepard, Andrea, 1995. Adoption of technologies with network
effects: an empirical examination of the adoption of automated teller
machines. RAND J. Econ. 26 (3), 479.
Sassen, S., 2002. Global Networks, Linked Cities. Routledge, London.
Saunders, C., Clark, S., 1992. EDI adoption and implementation: a focus on
interorganizational linkages. Inf. Resour. Manage. J. 5 (1), 9–19.
Schumpeter, Joseph A., 1943. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. Routledge,
London and New York.
Scott, Susan V., Barrett, M.,  2005. Strategic risk positioning as sensemaking in
crisis: the adoption of electronic trading at the London international ﬁnancial
futures and options exchange. J. Strategic Inf. Syst. 14 (1), 45–68.
Scott, Susan V., Walsham, G., 1998. Shifting boundaries and new technologies: a
case study in the UK banking sector. In: In Proceedings of the International
Conference of Information Systems, Helsinki, Finland, pp. 177–187.
Scott, Susan V., Zachariadis, Markos, 2012. Origins and development of SWIFT,
1973–2009. Bus. Hist. 54 (3), 462–482.
2014. The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT):
Cooperative Governance for Network Innovation, Standards, and Community.
Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, London; New York, NY.
Shapiro, C., Varian, H., 1999. Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network
Economy. Business School Press, Boston, MA:  Harvard.
Siegel, Donald, Griliches, Zvi, 1992. Purchased services, outsourcing, computers,
and productivity in manufacturing. In: the Service Sectors (Ed.), In Output
Measurement Zvi Griliches. National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.,
429-60.
Sinha, Rajiv K., Chandrashekaran, Murali, 1992. A split hazard model for analyzing
the diffusion of innovations. J. Mark. Res. 29 (1), 116–127.
Slade, Margaret, 2004. Models of ﬁrm-level proﬁtability. Int. J. Ind Organ. 22,
289–308.
Solow, Robert., 1987. We’d Better Watch Out. New York Times.
Stiroh, Kevin, 2002. Information technology and the US productivity revival: what
do  the industry data say? Am.  Econ. Rev. 92 (5), 1559–1576.
Thong, J.Y.L., Yap, C.S., Raman, K.S., 1996. Top management support, external
expertise and information systems implementation in small businesses. Inf.
Syst. Res. 7 (2), 248–267.
Tyre, M.J., Orlikowski, W.J., 1994. Windows of opportunity: temporal patterns of
technological adaptation in organizations. Organ. Sci. 5 (1), 98–118.
Van de Ven, Andrew, 1986. Central problems in the management of innovation.
Manage. Sci. 32 (5), 590–607.
Weber, Bruce W.,  1994. Information technology in the major international
ﬁnancial markets. In: Deans, Candace P., Karwan, Kirk R. (Eds.), In Global
Information Systems and Technology: Focus on the Organization and Its
Functional Areas. IGI Publishing, pp. 132–166.
Weill, Peter, Olson, Margrethe H., 1989. Managing investment in information
technology: mini case examples and implications. MIS  Q., 3–18.
Weill, Peter, 1992. The relationship between investment in information
technology and ﬁrm performance: a study of the valve manufacturing sector.
Inf.  Syst. Res. 3 (4), 307–333.
Weirdt, D., Hadji-Ashraﬁ, M.S., Randall, P., Scott, S.V., 2005. Standards: Building a
Generic Template. Dialogue, The SWIFT Community.Power. Basic Books, New York.
